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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ours is a divided system of intellectual property. Rather than rely-
ing on a single set of rules to protect all forms of intangible creation, 
intellectual property (“IP”) law sorts creative things into a variety of 
different regimes — utility patent, design patent, copyright, and 
trademark — each with different rules regarding eligibility, infringe-
ment, and defenses. Because we have a divided system, every area of 
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intellectual property law must wrestle with a fundamental series of 
questions regarding what’s in and what’s out. Out of the entire uni-
verse of potentially protectable things, what will utility patent, design 
patent, copyright, and/or trademark law protect? More specifically, 
what are the boundaries between each of the legal regimes that to-
gether make up the law of intellectual property? Why is a poem copy-
rightable but not patentable? Why is a mousetrap patentable but not 
copyrightable? 
This Article is about a particular aspect of this broad boundary is-
sue, namely the boundaries of utility patent law. What sorts of things 
are sorted into the utility patent system rather than into the copyright, 
trademark, or design patent systems? That question matters for patent 
law, obviously, as some of the current debates about patentable sub-
ject matter attest. 
But the delineation problem of patent law’s boundaries spills over 
into a much bigger set of questions about the structure of the IP sys-
tem because copyright, trademark, and design patent all contain doc-
trines that are designed, at least in significant part, to exclude “useful” 
or “functional” matter on the basis that those things belong to utility 
patent law. This is a foundational point; every other area of IP under-
stands its own domain to some extent in negative relation to utility 
patent. Trademark law excludes functional product features even 
when those features indicate the source of products and services. It 
does so because functional features are the province of utility patent 
and therefore do not belong to trademark law even if they do indicate 
source.1 Likewise, copyright (inconsistently) excludes systems, pro-
cesses, and so-called “methods of operation,” not because these things 
lack originality, but because they belong to utility patent.2 Design pa-
tent (nominally) excludes functional designs not because they are not 
novel or nonobvious or ornamental, but because they perform a func-
tion and therefore belong to utility patent instead.3  
To be clear, none of these doctrines are premised on the idea that 
all excluded subject matter must be protected by utility patent. 
Trademark law, for example, does not exclude functional features on 
the expectation that they inevitably will be protected by utility pa-
                                                                                                 
1. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (“Functionality 
doctrine therefore would require . . . that even if customers have come to identify the special 
illumination-enhancing shape of a new patented light bulb with a particular manufacturer, 
the manufacturer may not use that shape as a trademark, for doing so, after the patent had 
expired, would impede competition . . .”).  
2. See Pamela Samuelson, Strategies for Managing the Boundaries Between Copyright 
and Patent Protection 24 (Feb. 2, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
3. See, e.g., High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1315–16 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013). 
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tents;4 nor does copyright exclude methods of operation in the expec-
tation that those methods will be patentable in all cases.5 Instead, each 
area of IP excludes certain subject matter on the basis that it is of the 
type for which utility patent has the exclusive right to make policy 
judgments about protection. These exclusion doctrines apply even if 
(and perhaps especially if) particular claimed subject matter fails to 
meet patent’s entry requirements (because, for instance, it is not nov-
el) and is thus not protected.6  
The way in which IP doctrines establish boundaries embeds a 
clear view that some forms of overlapping protection are a problem — 
that despite differences in the nature of the rights granted by copy-
right, trademark, and design patent, the ability to use those forms of 
protection for useful features, the purview of utility patent, would un-
dermine the policy judgments of the utility patent system regarding 
what should be protected and what should instead be open to imita-
tion.7 But this kind of structure works only if each of those other sys-
tems has a reasonably clear and stable sense of what belongs to utility 
patent law. That is to say, we can’t coherently build a system that is 
designed to keep certain features out of non-patent forms of protection 
on the ground that they belong to utility patent unless we understand 
what kinds of features are in the domain of utility patent.  
                                                                                                 
4. As Judge Easterbrook said, “[f]unctionality is determined by a feature’s usefulness, not 
its patentability or its infringement of a patent.” Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 
855, 858 (7th Cir. 2010). 
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2016) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, 
or embodied in such work.”). 
6. See Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress & Competition in Design, 
17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 19 (2013) (“Copyright, trademark, and design patent each in 
their own way refuse protection to ‘useful’ or ‘functional’ features because those features 
are the exclusive province of utility patent law. Put differently, each of those systems subor-
dinates its own policy goals to the dynamic competition goals of utility patent law . . .”). Cf. 
Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Authorship Screen 6–7 (Feb. 8, 2017) (manuscript on 
file with authors) (making the analogous point that patent law’s exclusion of innovation that 
is the proper subject of copyright law does not depend on the assumption that copyright will 
actually protect that material, only that “copyright law should determine the conditions 
under which non-functional innovation can and cannot be protected.”).  
7. We do not attempt a full defense of that view here, but we note that concerns about use 
of other forms of IP to protect “functional” features are widely shared. See, e.g., Baker v. 
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (“To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in 
the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, 
would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of 
copyright.”); Samuelson, supra note 2 (cataloging a variety of approaches courts have used 
to avoid copyright being used to protect functional features); Christopher Buccafusco & 
Mark A. Lemley, Screening Functionality 2 (Feb. 26, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with authors) (“Preventing non-utility patent IP regimes from protecting function makes 
good sense . . . Without the ability to screen out functionality, creators could use copyright, 
trade dress, or design patent law to obtain the equivalent of a utility patent without having to 
do the work required to get one.”); McKenna & Strandburg, supra note 6. 
494  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 30 
 
Courts and scholars conventionally describe utility patent law as 
focusing on technological innovation. While the concept of “techno-
logical” innovation has never been fully fleshed out, a number of utili-
ty patent law’s traditional doctrinal and structural features are broadly 
consistent with that understanding of innovation. But modern devel-
opments have muddied the water considerably,8 to the point that we 
think it’s fair to say that patent law’s focus on technological innova-
tion is now inconsistent, at best. This Article argues that this incon-
sistency is at least a partial explanation for courts’ notorious difficulty 
applying the channeling doctrines in other areas of IP. Lack of a clear 
sense of utility patent law’s boundaries undermines the very idea of 
channeling.  
Serious as the resulting doctrinal problems have been, the prob-
lem is much more than a doctrinal one. Trademark, copyright, and 
design patent all remit to patent “useful” or “functional” matter — 
refusing to extend their own forms of protection, even if that protec-
tion would otherwise be justified on trademark, copyright, or design 
patent terms, because that subject matter belongs to utility patent. For 
that reason, IP incentives are necessarily shaped by the ways we sort 
some subject matter into patent law and others not. Different mixes of 
IP regimes (and of IP regimes with other types of regulatory exclu-
sivity or other legal rules) will promote competition along different 
dimensions. A patent-heavy system will promote competition along 
utilitarian or conventionally “functional” characteristics; systems that 
rely more on trademark law will promote competition along other 
more psychological or phenomenological dimensions.  
To see this, consider a blue pill that treats depression. Part of the 
efficacy of the pill is the chemical compound of which it’s comprised. 
But imagine that the pill’s blue color also provides some component 
of its therapeutic effect. This is not a fanciful example; the color of 
pills can trigger powerful placebo responses that provide a substantial 
component of the clinical efficacy of some drugs.9 Is the pill color 
“useful”?  
One could argue that placebo triggers seem to have the type of 
utility with which patent law is typically most comfortable since their 
effect is, at least at times, indistinguishable from that of the chemical 
compound. Even if patent law were to consider the pill color useful, 
the novelty and nonobviousness requirements would nonetheless bar 
many, if not most, placebo triggers.10 Perhaps that is why we don’t see 
                                                                                                 
8. See Section II.B, infra. 
9. See A. J. de Craen et al, Effect of Colour of Drugs: Systematic Review of Perceived Ef-
fect of Drugs and of their Effectiveness, 313 BMJ 1624, 1625 (1996).  
10. Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 280 (1977) (changing the color or shape of an invention may not make it novel).  
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much (if any) patenting in this area. If that’s true, and assuming that 
the incentive justification of patent holds in this context, then patent 
law will direct innovation away from the placebo component of effi-
cacy and toward the pharmacological component, at least relative to 
the state in which patent law protected the color.  
There is a second possibility. If trademark law and patent law 
both maintain the view that pill color is not useful, then trademark 
will potentially allow protection of the color as trade dress.11 Since 
trademark protection would create the exclusive rights to use the dress 
within a particular product category, trade dress protection would in-
centivize investment in the placebo color via trademark law if an ex-
clusive right to use that color would tilt the competitive field in the 
direction of the trade dress owner.  
On the most superficial level, it seems as if we’re replacing one 
incentive with another, but that’s not right. Utility patent law provides 
a very broad but relatively short-term (twenty years, generally) prop-
erty right.12 Utility patent rights are subject to strict entry condi-
tions — principally, the need to show novelty and nonobviousness.13 
In contrast, trademark provides a narrower right — in the case of col-
ors, trademark law protects only marks that have gained consumer 
recognition as indications of source (so-called “secondary mean-
ing”),14 and such protection is generally only available when the use 
of a similar mark is likely to confuse consumers regarding the source 
of the junior user’s product.15 On the other hand, relative to patent, 
trademark erects much lower entry barriers. Most significantly, 
trademark protection requires neither novelty nor utility.16 
Finally, there is a third possible outcome. Trademark does not 
protect “functional” elements, even when they are source-indicating.17 
As a result, if patent considers the placebo trigger to be useful, then 
trademark law will likely refuse to protect it. The result could easily 
                                                                                                 
11. Trade dress refers to the visual appearance of a product or its packaging. When it is 
distinctive (meaning that it indicates the commercial source of the goods with which it is 
used) and nonfunctional, it is protectable under the Lanham Act on substantially the same 
terms as trademarks. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2016). 
12. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2016). 
13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03 (2016). 
14. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995).  
15. Trademark law also permits a cause of action for trademark dilution — i.e., unauthor-
ized use of a mark that, even in the absence of confusion, diminishes the distinctiveness of 
the famous mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). But that form of protection is only available for 
famous marks, defined as those “widely recognized by the general consuming public of the 
United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A).  
16. Actually, trademark does require a very specific kind of utility — the ability to desig-
nate source — but it refuses to consider that attribute to be functional or useful. 
17. See Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165. 
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be that placebo triggers are protected under neither body of law — 
barred from patent for lack of novelty or obviousness, and excluded 
from trademark because they are functional. In which case, what’s left 
is a utility patent incentive to invest in pharmacological efficacy and 
whatever market incentives exist to find new placebo triggers even in 
the absence of legal exclusivity.18 
Which of these three outcomes — (1) no protection for placebos, 
(2) patent protection of placebos as useful inventions, or (3) trademark 
protection of placebos as non-useful source indicators — is most de-
sirable? The answer to that question depends upon a host of factors, 
including the cost of achieving an increment of efficacy via the psy-
chological mechanism (the placebo) compared to the pharmacological 
one. The first outcome, no IP protection for the placebo color, might 
look terrible if pharmacological advances in a particular field are 
much costlier than beneficial placebo-driven “psychological” ef-
fects — at least if innovations in placebo (for example, the production 
of new placebo triggers) are responsive to IP protection and some in-
centive is needed. Choosing between these outcomes would also re-
quire information about the degree to which trademark protection of 
placebos would foreclose competition, particularly in comparison to 
the shorter-term (but potentially more complete) foreclosure that the 
patent system would create. And any competitive harm would need to 
be assessed relative to any delay in development of these triggers that 
might result if inventors were unable to protect their inventions and 
prevent others from copying and profiting from them.  
Just to be clear: we’re not making an argument for changing to 
any particular set of IP rules for pills, poems, mousetraps, or anything 
else. Exactly what the mix of IP rules should be depends on the sort of 
innovation incentives society wants to create, and that judgment in-
volves context-specific knowledge that is far outside the scope of this 
Article. Our point is that, until we understand precisely what we mean 
when we say an article or a feature of an article is “useful” or “func-
tional,” and until we have a calculus for understanding the particular 
value of any such features, we can’t think coherently about which 
types of competition we want to promote or the costs of promoting 
that competition. Nor can we even think about how best to satisfy 
consumer demand, or how different IP regimes help shape that de-
mand. We are blind to a variety of considerations that actually affect 
consumer welfare. 
                                                                                                 
18. To be clear, those market incentives may well be adequate. Our point is only that the 
incentives are very different, and that difference should be considered in designing a legal 
response.  
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In this Article, we first describe the ways that different branches 
of IP conceive of their own domains — and particularly how branches 
of IP other than utility patent employ doctrines that attempt to send to 
utility patent the subject matter those branches understand to belong 
there. Our goal here is not primarily to launch a normative argument 
about the content of IP’s subject matter rules. Our mission is instead 
to explore the theoretical adequacy of IP’s own account of its internal 
structure, and whether that account is reflected in doctrine that is sta-
ble and capable of providing broadly predictable answers to categori-
zation questions. More specifically, we mean to highlight how patent 
law’s inconsistency on its subject matter rules creates problems for 
other branches of IP that are attempting to operationalize a utility pa-
tent supremacy principle and render unto utility patent what belongs 
to utility patent. We describe utility patent law’s inconsistency in Part 
II.  
Part III focuses on the accounts that trademark, copyright and de-
sign patent courts have offered of what sorts of subject matter those 
bodies of law should channel to utility patent. In sum, these branches 
of the IP system retain a view of utility patent’s domain that is pegged 
to an earlier time, and today they all struggle mightily because utility 
patent’s domain is far from clear. Finally, Part IV assesses the conse-
quences for IP policy of the ongoing confusion over what sort of “use-
ful” or “functional” inventions belong to utility patent. The weak 
foundation of many of IP’s subject matter boundary doctrines makes 
it difficult, as we will show, to design an IP system that provokes par-
ticular sorts of desired innovation. For that reason, more coherence in 
IP’s channeling doctrines would be a boon to rational IP policymak-
ing.  
II. THE DIVIDED NATURE OF OUR IP SYSTEM 
As noted above, our IP system is a divided one. Patent, copyright, 
and trademark law all apply to particular (and largely different) sub-
ject matter. Indeed, the sense that subject matter belongs to particular 
regimes underlies IP lawyers’ deep frustration at journalists’ habitual 
mislabeling of IP concepts — as when news reports refer to a person 
“copyrighting their name.”19  
                                                                                                 
19. See, e.g., William McGeveran (@BillMcGev), TWITTER (Mar. 19, 2017, 9:14 PM)  
https://twitter.com/BillMcGev/status/843677211899187202 [https://perma.cc/Q6HL-PS2E]; 
Tara Aaron (@tara_aaron), TWITTER (Feb. 6, 2017, 6:57 AM) https://twitter.com/ 
tara_aaron/status/828618622771802112 [https://perma.cc/B37C-HR4W]; Why It’s Not OK 
for Journalists to get Intellectual Property Law Wrong, PLAGARISM TODAY (Feb. 19, 2013), 
https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2013/02/19/why-its-not-ok-for-journalists-to-get-
intellectual-property-law-wrong/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2017). 
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IP law’s divided structure is not inevitable, of course, and the idea 
that different subject matter belongs to certain systems of IP is under 
some pressure. Indeed, some have called for the elimination of all of 
the subject-matter requirements of section 101 of the Patent Act,20 and 
that view could be generalized across IP.21 One could argue that no 
particular subject matter “belongs” to any branch of IP law, at least in 
the strong sense that it should be excluded categorically from other 
forms of protection. Instead, our tendency to sort different subject 
matter into different branches of IP law could simply be a conse-
quence of the fact that, while the stated subject matter categories are 
amply inclusive, other doctrinal constraints tend to rule out certain 
kinds of subject matter with regularity. On that view, it’s not that utili-
ty patent is categorically limited to technological innovation, it’s 
simply that other forms of innovation are unlikely to satisfy require-
ments like novelty and nonobviousness. 
We don’t agree with that characterization, in part because it can-
not explain why, if subject matter was never meant to be treated cate-
gorically, the eligibility rules for each regime differ so significantly. 
Copyright attaches automatically to any original work of authorship 
upon fixation,22 and the originality threshold is generally understood 
to be quite low.23 Patent rights, on the other hand, can be acquired 
only by applying for a patent and successfully navigating a rigorous 
examination process in which the Patent Office considers, among oth-
er things, the novelty and nonobviousness of the claimed invention — 
the latter of which is understood to be a comparatively significant 
hurdle.24 These differences can’t be explained simply on the ground 
that copyrights last longer and require copying (both features that, of 
                                                                                                 
20. David Kappos, former Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
proposed abolishing section 101, which defines the subject matter of patent altogether. See 
Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101 of Patent Act, LAW360 (Apr. 12, 
2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/783604/kappos-calls-for-abolition-of-section-101-
of-patent-act [https://perma.cc/WB73-QECV]. 
21. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 13 (“Like the Weil treatise before it, the Nimmer 
treatise has, for the past fifty-some years, asserted that copyright and utility patent law can 
provide overlapping protections to intellectual creations.”). 
22. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, 
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . .”). 
23. See Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original, 
as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the 
author . . . and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the 
requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.”) (citations 
omitted). 
24. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2016). See also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 
415–16 (2007) (“For over a half century, the Court has held that a “patent for a combination 
which only unites old elements with no change in their respective functions . . . obviously 
withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the re-
sources available to skillful men.”) (citation omitted). 
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course, themselves need some explanation). It seems much more like-
ly that copyright and patent developed different entry requirements 
because those rules were developed with particular subject matter in 
mind. 
The notion that the forms of IP are not categorical faces another 
serious challenge to its validity: it does not match the way courts de-
scribe the purposes of the various channeling doctrines we see in de-
sign patent, copyright, and trademark law. As the following Sections 
describe in more detail, each of those other areas of IP quite explicitly 
defines its own subject matter negatively in relation to patent, at least 
in some instances. Yet because they have internalized the idea that 
utility patent is focused on technological utility, these doctrines have 
particular notions of what should be excluded.25  
Many of these channeling doctrines were created at a time when 
the subject matter of all areas of IP was narrower,26 so it’s possible 
that the notions of the domain of utility patent that undergird these 
doctrines reflects a once-clearer division between IP systems. But as 
we argue below, it is now much harder to attribute to utility patent law 
a coherent theory of its domain. As a result, the channeling doctrines 
in other areas of IP are to some extent artificial; the lines they draw do 
not clearly reflect the much broader subject matter of modern utility 
patent. 
There are two major issues here. One is a misfit between the pur-
ported purposes of these channeling doctrines and the domain of utili-
ty patent. Insofar as the channeling doctrines intend to render unto 
utility patent what belongs to utility patent, misalignment with patent 
law regarding its domain means that the channeling necessarily will 
                                                                                                 
25. See, for example, Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 
2015), aff’d, No. 15-866 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2017), in which the majority rejected Star’s conten-
tion that cheerleading uniforms identify the wearer as a cheerleader and defined the relevant 
function as “cover[ing] the body, wick[ing] away moisture, and withstand[ing] the rigors of 
athletic movements,” while the dissent believed that identification of the wearer as a cheer-
leader was an important part of the function of the article. The Supreme Court granted certi-
orari, but did not resolve the conflict — indeed, other than implicitly determining that the 
cheerleader uniform itself was a useful article in the way that apparel is thought to be gener-
ally (i.e., useful as body cover), the Court did not consider whether the patterns of stripes, 
chevrons, and other design elements claimed by the Respondent Varsity Brands themselves 
functioned as useful articles. The district court had agreed with Star’s view that these design 
elements functioned to identify the wearer as a cheerleader. See Case No. 10-2508, 2014 
LEXIS 26279, *8–*9 (WD Tenn., Mar. 1, 2014). And an insightful amicus brief submitted 
to the Supreme Court argued that the design elements had an even more specific function — 
they shaped the appearance of the wearer’s body in ways that made her appear more appeal-
ing as a cheerleader. See Brief of Profs. Christopher Buccafusco and Jeanne Fromer as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/07/15-866_amicus_pet_professor_buccafuso_and_professor_fromer.pdf. 
26. For a discussion of the ways subject matter expansion has put more pressure on scope 
doctrines, see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
2197, 2214–19 (2016). 
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be over- or under-inclusive. Second, if we accept that channeling doc-
trines are justified because patent law alone defines the terms on 
which protection should be available for features in utility patent 
law’s domain, then to the extent misalignment is the result of other 
areas of IP maintaining an anachronistically narrow view of utility 
patent, the existing channeling doctrines may actually not be aggres-
sive enough. Put simply, if modern utility patent law is in fact open to 
much more than technological innovation, then maybe design patent, 
trademark, and copyright ought to be excluding a whole lot more ma-
terial.  
A. Utility Patent Doctrine and Technological Utility 
On its face, utility patent law seems open to quite a wide range of 
subject matter. The statute nowhere expressly limits patent to a partic-
ular kind of innovation, and the subject matter categories are quite 
broad, encompassing “any new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter.”27 Those categories would appear to 
allow nearly anything to be claimed as patentable subject matter — 
even a poem could be claimed as a manufacture with particular words. 
Indeed, the Committee Report accompanying the 1952 Act suggested 
as much, stating that Congress intended statutory subject matter to 
“include anything under the sun that is made by man.”28 Of course, 
the subject matter categories are not the only constraints on patenta-
bility. For one thing, the Patent Act requires that the claimed inven-
tion have utility.29 But that requirement does very little to limit patent 
law’s domain, as modern utility doctrine requires only that a claimed 
invention work for its intended purpose and have some credible use.30 
While a claimed invention must have some use beyond being the ob-
ject of future research, virtually any other identifiable use will do, and 
only one such use need be identified.31 Thus, outside of a few particu-
lar fields, courts do not investigate whether an invention meets the 
utility requirement with much seriousness.32  
                                                                                                 
27. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2016). 
28. S. REP. NO. 1979, at 4 (1952); H. R. REP. NO. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952). 
29. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2016) (requiring claimed matter to be “new and useful”) (emphasis 
added). 
30. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966). 
31. As Professor Michael Risch described it, “[T]he requirement that an invention be use-
ful has been nearly nonexistent — essentially ignored.” Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Use-
ful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 58 (2011). Claimed inventions cannot violate 
the laws of nature, see Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989), nor can 
they be so unlikely to work that someone skilled in the art would find them incredible, see 
Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
32. Noting the disconnect between the extremely permissive utility standards for most 
inventions and the impact of those standards in isolated fields, particularly “unpredictable 
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Nevertheless, for most of patent law’s history courts and scholars 
have shared a widespread understanding that patent law focuses on a 
particular kind of utility — one that is understood as technological.33 
Perhaps the most direct evidence of patent’s tacit adoption of a 
technological understanding of innovation is the existence of a sepa-
rate patent system for design. Design patent deals with innovative 
ornamental designs of articles of manufacture, and the law under-
stands ornamentality as the obverse of utility.34  
Indeed, only because utility patent law frames the concept of utili-
ty in technological terms does it make sense to have a separate system 
focused on design.35 If utility were understood more broadly, we 
would have a unified patent law that recognizes innovative ornamen-
tal designs as both new and useful. The unified law would recognize 
that appealing new designs have utility because they make products 
                                                                                                 
fields like chemistry, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals,” Professor Sean Seymore has 
proposed abolishing the utility requirement altogether and focusing instead on a useful 
disclosure. Sean Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1049 (2014).  
33. In a recent paper, Kevin Collins argues that utility patent law limits its own domain in 
part by negative reference to copyright law, screening out authorship by defining patent 
law’s domain in terms of functionality — a concept he takes to be broader than technologi-
cal. Collins, supra note 6. According to Professor Collins, patent law channels authorship to 
copyright through a series of doctrinal mechanisms that collectively focus patent law on 
functional innovations — those that “do” something that patent law recognizes as a func-
tion. Id. “One coherent, core sense of patentable ‘doing’ is physical, mechanical, or chemi-
cal,” according to Collins, but that core notion does not capture all of patentable 
functionality. Id. Indeed, Collins argues, modern patent law counts a variety of other kinds 
of “doing,” including “looking like” and operating in the sense of a game. Id.  
We agree with Collins that modern patent law includes a wider range of subject matter 
than that which “does something” in the physical, mechanical, or chemical sense — if those 
concepts are themselves sufficiently coherent. But we think that only proves our point — 
that patent law no longer has, if it ever did, a coherent theory of what kinds of “doing” 
count. In our view, it is inadequate simply to say that patent law recognizes various types of 
doing but rules out other types because they belong to copyright. Though we are inclined to 
agree that the deference afforded by other areas of IP ought not be unidirectional (meaning 
it would be better if all areas of IP defined their own territory in negative relation to the 
other areas of IP), operating that type of system still requires an affirmative sense of the 
subject matter that belongs in each domain. The system cannot be entirely negative, or else 
it is circular — i.e., copyright channels out that which belongs to patent, which is defined by 
that which does not belong to copyright.  
34. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 1502.01 (9th ed. Rev. 7, Nov. 2015) (“In general terms, a ‘utility patent’ 
protects the way an article is used and works, while a ‘design patent’ protects the way an 
article looks.”); PHG Techs., LLC v. St. John Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“‘If the patented design is primarily functional rather than ornamental, the patent is inva-
lid.’ The design of a useful article is deemed to be functional when ‘the appearance of the 
claimed design is “dictated by” the use or purpose of the article.’”) (quoting L.A. Gear, Inc. 
v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  
35. That is, to the extent design patent law makes sense at all. See McKenna & Strand-
burg, supra note 6, at 1 (arguing that a patent system for design makes sense only if one can 
evaluate progress in the integration of form and function).  
502  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 30 
 
better and more appealing, and because they shape consumer demand, 
which is itself a useful thing for any sort of innovation to do.  
But because patent law is focused on technological innovation, 
ornamental features require a distinct form of protection. Thus, in de-
fining the subject matter of design patents, courts have construed or-
namental to mean non-functional,36 ostensibly to prevent parties from 
using design patent law to gain protection for the kinds of useful fea-
tures that properly belong in utility patent.37  
Though the term “technological” has plenty of its own ambiguity, 
this characterization works outward from patent law’s archetypal sub-
ject matter (mechanical and chemical inventions)38 and is meant to 
convey that patent law is aimed at provoking the sort of innovation 
that can be explained in terms of scientific or engineering principles. 
This conception has a strong rationalist and physicalist orientation, 
and it distinguishes other forms of innovation, particularly those with 
phenomenological, aesthetic, or psychological utility. So utility patent 
law is not, for example, about innovations that appeal primarily to 
consumer sentiment — like those in marketing, advertising, packag-
ing, or design.39  
Professor Dennis Karjala captures patent’s technological sense of 
innovation well, in contrasting patent’s domain with that of copyright:  
With only a few exceptions, copyright has always 
eschewed protection of functional works, while func-
tional works of technology are the very stuff of pa-
tent subject matter. Moreover, patent law has tried to 
steer clear of works that are merely useful in the 
sense of informing human beings or portraying an 
appearance but not functional in the sense of actually 
doing work in the physical world. As a result, tradi-
                                                                                                 
36. See, e.g., High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1315 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (“[A] design patent can be declared invalid if the claimed design is ‘primarily 
functional’ rather than ‘primarily ornamental,’ i.e., if ‘the claimed design is “dictated by” 
the utilitarian purpose of the article.’”) (quoting L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1123).  
37. See McKenna & Strandburg, supra note 6 and cases cited. Professor Sarah Burstein 
has recently argued that ornamentality need not (and indeed should not) be reduced to non-
functionality. See Sarah Burstein, Commentary: Faux Amis in Design Law, 105 
TRADEMARK REP. 1455, 1456 (2015). Burstein may be right, normatively, but as a descrip-
tive matter ornamentality means non-functionality in current doctrine.  
38. See BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760–1911, at 142 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
1999) (noting that much of IP law’s structure is built from a focus on certain archetypal 
subject matter, which causes difficulty when applied to newer forms).  
39. Risch, supra note 31, at 72 (“[A] claim to the differently shaped hammer will be pa-
tentable only if the hammer’s novel shape provides some new or different useful benefit in 
driving nails . . . A new hammer’s patentable usefulness must be based on its ability to drive 
nails and not on its ornamental shape or door-stopping capabilities.”) (emphasis added).  
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tional patent and copyright subject matter divided ra-
ther cleanly between the nonfunctional, reserved to 
copyright, and the functional, reserved to patent.40  
As the end of Karjala’s characterization indicates, IP law is wont to 
include in patent’s domain only those things “doing work in the phys-
ical world,”41 even though it is quite clear that, in a broader sense, 
many other things are functional or useful in terms of having real 
world effects. Indeed, designers commonly describe the process of 
design as one of solving problems, by which they mean creating arti-
facts that are useful in a variety of different ways, not simply solving 
engineering problems.42 Marketers often speak of innovation in mar-
keting techniques affecting how products or services are perceived by 
consumers or how they perform in markets.43 But these kinds of inno-
vation are often — though not always — pushed out of the domain of 
utility patent because they are not the technological innovation patent 
law aims to promote.  
This focus on technological innovation is commonly tied to the 
constitutional text, which gives Congress the power to “promote the 
Progress of . . . the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”44 According to 
                                                                                                 
40. Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection of 
Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41, 41–42 (1998) (emphasis 
added). For a thorough discussion of the respective roles of utility patent and copyright in 
the software context, see Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer 
Programs, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2017).  
41. Karjala, supra note 40, at 42. 
42. See, e.g., KARL T. ULRICH, DESIGN: CREATION OF ARTIFACTS IN SOCIETY 2 (2011) 
(“Design is conceiving and giving form to artifacts that solve problems.”). Ulrich’s defini-
tion is a particularly broad one, in that he defines artifact to include “any product of inten-
tional creation, including physical goods, services, software, graphics, buildings, 
landscapes, organizations, and processes.” Id. He also uses problem solving quite broadly, 
meaning to include problems not only of physical use, but also of aesthetics, consumer 
demand, and many other things. Id. at 14, 20.  
43. See, e.g., Vikash Naidoo, Firm Survival Through a Crisis: The Influence of Market 
Orientation, Marketing Innovation and Business Strategy, 39 INDUS. MKTG. MGMT. 1311 
(2010); Beth Comstock, Innovation Is Marketing’s Job Too, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 3, 
2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/innovation-is-marketings-job-too [https://perma.cc/Q8KZ-
PELK]; Pat Hong, 5 Examples of Innovative Marketing Strategies, LINKDEX LTD. (Aug. 24, 
2015), https://www.linkdex.com/en-us/inked/innovative-marketing-strategies-examples/ 
[https://perma.cc/S9TC-LU7Y] (“While innovation has been acknowledged as a fundamen-
tal quality for product and tech teams for some time now, innovative practices are also in-
creasingly being applied to marketing.”). 
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. According to Professor Edward Walterscheid, “[i]n 1787 
‘useful arts’ meant helpful or valuable trades. Therefore, to promote the progress of useful 
arts presupposed an intent to advance or forward the course or procession of such trades.” 
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Back-
ground and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 52–53 (1994).  
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the Federal Circuit, “the exclusive right [granted by the Patent Act], 
constitutionally derived, was for the national purpose of advancing the 
useful arts — the process today called technological innovation.”45 
Scholars also regularly equate the useful arts with technological inno-
vation.46  
A number of structural features of the Patent Office reflect this 
technological focus, including the requirement of technical training to 
be admitted to the Patent Bar,47 the organization of the Patent Office 
by technical art unit,48 and the USPTO’s elaborate classification 
scheme, which organizes patent documents according to technical 
field.49  
The text of the Patent Act can be read consistently with this un-
derstanding. Machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter call 
to mind products, factories, and substances, all of which are physical 
artifacts we recognize as falling within the conceptual category of 
technology.50 Since all of these subject matter categories are modified 
                                                                                                 
45. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“This result furthers the 
basic purpose of the patent system.”); I/P Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 F. App’x. 982, 996 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he constitutional grant of authority ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts . . .’ ‘is both a grant of power and a limitation . . . Section 101’s vital 
role . . . is to insure that patent protection promotes, rather than impedes, scientific progress 
and technological innovation.’”) (citations omitted).  
46. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 
1139, 1140 (1999) [hereinafter Thomas, Liberal Professions] (describing the Patent Act’s 
subject matter categories as “embodying the current understanding” of the useful arts “to 
mean the technological arts”); David J. Kappos, John R. Thomas & Randall Bluestone, A 
Technological Contribution Requirement for Patentable Subject Matter: Supreme Court 
Precedent and Policy, 6 NORTHWESTERN J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 152, 153 (2008) (con-
necting the “useful Arts” with technological innovation specifically and arguing that, in our 
constitutional context, “patentable advances must be tied to a particular machine or appa-
ratus, or alternatively, must reside in the physical transformation of an article to a different 
state or thing.”).  
47. General Requirements Bulletin for Admission to the Examination for Registration to 
Practice in Patent Cases before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ 
OED_GRB.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG3S-AMWY] (“An applicant applying for the examina-
tion must demonstrate to the Director of the Office of Enrollment and Discipline (OED) that 
he or she possesses the scientific and technical training necessary to provide valuable ser-
vice to patent applicants.”). 
48. Classification Standards and Development, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
(Feb. 7, 2017, 9:13 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-search/ 
classification-standards-and-development [https://perma.cc/3HM3-SK7E] (“The Patent 
Technology Center Directors coordinate patent examination through Art Units. The term, 
Art Unit, refers to the group of professionals responsible for a cluster of related patent art.”). 
49. Examiner Handbook to the U.S. Classification System, U.S. PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE (July 21, 2016, 9:57 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/patent/laws-and-
regulations/examiner-handbook-us-patent-classification-system.html 
[https://perma.cc/6JCB-EDGN]. 
50. The link between those subject matter constraints and the useful arts was even clearer 
in early statutory text. The subject matter of the Patent Act of 1790 was “any useful art, 
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by the requirement that they be useful, it is not surprising that courts, 
lawyers, commentators and the Patent Office might understand the 
utility requirement in light of the technological focus of these catego-
ries. The influence might also run the other way — courts may be 
tempted in some cases simply to assume the utility of claims directed, 
for example, to machines. The fact that a claim is directed to subject 
matter with a technological cast might be sufficient evidence of the 
invention’s utility. 
Several significant doctrinal rules also reflect a focus on techno-
logical innovation. For example, while a party’s public use of an in-
vention more than one year prior to the date of application ordinarily 
precludes patentability, courts have long recognized that the bar will 
not apply if the party can establish that the use was experimental.51 
But this rule is importantly limited: legitimate experimentation is in-
tended to “perfect[] or complet[e] an invention to the point of deter-
mining that it will work for its intended purpose.”52 Market testing is 
explicitly ruled out; only experimentation relating to the technical 
aspects of the invention counts.53  
Similarly, the technological framing of patent law is ultimately 
behind the rule that mere printed matter is not patentable.54 Printed 
matter would seem to fit comfortably in the category of manufacture, 
but the intuition underlying the exclusion is that mere printed matter 
doesn’t do anything.55 It’s the same intuition that led a court to reject 
a utility patent on the design of the back pocket of jeans.56 These 
                                                                                                 
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement thereon not before known or 
used.” Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
51. See City of Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 134 (1877) 
(“The use of an invention by the inventor himself, or of any other person under his direc-
tion, by way of experiment, and in order to bring the invention to perfection, has never been 
regarded as [public use].”). 
52. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
53. See, e.g., In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[The experimental use 
exception] does not include market testing where the inventor is attempting to gauge con-
sumer demand for his claimed invention”). 
54. See Collins, supra note 6, at 19–21; Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: Taking 
the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379, 1379 (2010) [hereinafter Collins, 
Printed Matter].  
55. Collins argues that the printed matter rule works as an “informative authorship 
screen,” channeling information to copyright because it is non-functional. See Collins, supra 
note 6, at 8–11; Collins, Printed Matter, supra note 54, at 1405 n.148. As Collins acknowl-
edges, these kinds of screens are not presented in patent law as channeling doctrines — 
meaning patent law does not “invoke a term like ‘authorship’ that affirmatively defines 
copyright’s proper domain.” See Collins, supra note 6. To the extent these screens channel 
to copyright, it is only by virtue of negatively defining patent law’s domain in a way that 
excludes this subject matter. Id. In that way, patent law’s authorship screens are unlike the 
channeling doctrines in other areas of IP, which do explicitly invoke patent law’s domain to 
exclude subject matter that would otherwise qualify for protection. 
56. See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Golden Trade, S.r.L., Nos. 92 Civ. 1667, 90 Civ. 6291, 90 
Civ. 6292, 1995 WL 710822, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1995) (“The appearance of the ran-
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kinds of exclusions reflect gut-level attempts to differentiate the sub-
ject matter of utility patent from that of copyright or design patent, 
and there may well be good reasons to do that. But the distinctions are 
rarely well theorized, since the back pocket of a pair of jeans is clearly 
a manufacture with utility both to the manufacturers and consumers of 
the jeans. Implicitly, then, these doctrines reflect a judgment that “aes-
thetic” utility, even if it shapes market demand, is not the right kind of 
utility.  
The nonobviousness requirement also embeds a particular under-
standing of the type of innovation with which patent law is concerned. 
The test for obviousness focuses on the technical achievement of the 
invention, asking whether, in light of the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art, the invention would have been 
obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the relevant art.57 In as-
sessing obviousness, courts are to consider certain “secondary” fac-
tors, including commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, and 
the failure of others.58 But the Federal Circuit has been quite clear that 
the secondary factors are only indicative of nonobviousness when 
there is a nexus with the technical achievement — that is, the claimed 
invention — reflected in the patent.59  
                                                                                                 
dom faded effect on the jeans attracts attention but does not affect the utility of the jeans 
themselves.”).  
57. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2016); Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 15 (1966) (“If this differ-
ence [between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art] is such that the 
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a person skilled in the art, 
then the subject matter cannot be patented.”); KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 
421 (2007) (“When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem and there 
are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good 
reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the 
anticipated success, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and com-
mon sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it 
was obvious under § 103.”). 
58. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
59. See, e.g., Tokai Corp. v. Easton Enters., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(“Regarding commercial success, this factor ‘may have relevancy’ to the over-
all obviousness determination, but a nexus must exist between the commercial success and 
the claimed invention.”) (citing Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1311–12 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Evidence of commercial success . . . is only significant if there is a nexus 
between the claimed invention and the commercial success.”)). The Federal Circuit has also 
required courts in design patent cases to evaluate secondary considerations in evaluating the 
obviousness of a claimed design. See High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 
F.3d 1301, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2013). But notably, the requisite nexus between, for example, 
commercial success and the merit of the invention relates to the merit of the design as such. 
See, e.g., Petersen Mfg., Inc. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (“With respect to the argument based on the fourth inquiry under Graham, in this 
case . . . there is no evidence that the acceptance of the tool is due to its ornamental appear-
ance rather than to its filling the need for a quality tool of this type.”); Tyco Industries, Inc. 
v. Tiny Love, Ltd., 914 F. Supp. 1068, 1081 (D.N.J. 1996) (“The problem with Tiny Love’s 
argument is that it has failed to establish the requisite nexus between any alleged commer-
cial success and/or Tyco’s alleged copying and the ornamental aspects of the claimed de-
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The same can be said — although at a deeper conceptual level — 
about the legal standards by which patent law judges obviousness. 
Patentability is assessed according to a cumulative notion of progress 
in which inventions are judged against what came before them. Not 
only must a claimed invention be new, it must also be different 
enough from the prior art to represent a significant leap.60 Patent law 
stands in sharp contrast to copyright in its willingness to assess the 
size of technological advances. It does so both because it recognizes 
the importance of cumulative innovation and because that assessment 
is more feasible in the context of technological innovation.61 “We of-
ten can agree on how to assess technical improvement” — for exam-
ple, computers can be engineered to run faster, contain more memory, 
or be cheaper or more durable.62 This point about non-obviousness is 
very important to our sense that patent law is distinctive. Copyright 
long ago repudiated any similar requirement of incremental progress, 
largely limiting the threshold condition to originality, which the Su-
preme Court has interpreted to mean only that “the work was inde-
pendently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other 
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativi-
ty.”63 These are not difficult requirements to meet. According to the 
Court, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight 
amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite 
easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, 
humble or obvious’ it might be.”64 In sum, copyright’s originality cri-
terion does not entail difference.65  
These pervasive differences between patent and copyright doc-
trine reflect fundamentally different intuitions about the ways in 
which inventive versus expressive creativity function and how they 
benefit society. As Professor Barton Beebe has persuasively argued, 
we have never had a good metric for evaluating progress in the fine 
                                                                                                 
sign. Since this is a design patent case, Tiny Love would have to prove that the commercial 
success and copying was due to the GYMINI Gym’s appearance and not to any of its func-
tional attributes.”).  
60. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 424–25 (holding the claimed adjustable gas pedal with electron-
ic sensor obvious in light of prior art of adjustable gas pedals and prior art electronic sensors 
because the combination “would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill.”).  
61. See McKenna & Strandburg, supra note 6, at 7.  
62. Id.  
63. Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  
64. Id. (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 1.08[C][1] (1990)).  
65. Id. at 345–46 (arguing that originality does not signify novelty. Two poets, for exam-
ple, each ignorant of the other, might compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet 
both are original and, hence, copyrightable).  
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arts.66 For that reason, courts have generally found it impossible to 
measure the extent to which a particular combination of previous ex-
pression has advanced over the prior works. As the Supreme Court 
stated more than one hundred years ago, in Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co.67:  
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons 
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final 
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside 
of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one 
extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them 
repulsive until the public had learned the new lan-
guage in which their author spoke. It may be more 
than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of 
Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been 
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the 
other end, copyright would be denied to pictures 
which appealed to a public less educated than the 
judge. Yet if they command the interest of any pub-
lic, they have a commercial value — it would be 
bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educa-
tional value — and the taste of any public is not to be 
treated with contempt.68 
Copyright doctrine thus appears to have settled on a quantitative, 
rather than a qualitative, conception of progress — more is better, 
rather than better is better. Within patent law’s technological domain, 
more has never been the criterion. Patent law aims for better.  
B. Inconsistency in Practice 
Despite the widespread understanding that utility patent law is fo-
cused on technological innovation and the reflection of that under-
standing in a wide range of features of the patent system, in practice 
patent law (at least modern patent law) is actually not so constrained. 
At its core, patent law has always presented the possibility of reaching 
beyond technological utility to cover things that are useful in a broad-
er sense — for example, because they affect consumer dispositions or 
                                                                                                 
66. Barton Beebe, Bleistein, American Copyright Law, and the Problem of Aesthetic 
Progress 13–14 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).  
67. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).  
68. Id. at 251–52. 
No. 2] What’s In, and What’s Out 509 
 
tastes.69 The statutory subject-matter categories of manufactures and 
compositions of matter, for example, even if traditionally understood 
to refer to inventions of industrial application,70 are amply inclusive of 
a wider range of materials that are only functional in a broader sense. 
But the subject matter category covering “process[es]” is particu-
larly capacious. On the one hand, the term prototypically refers to 
industrial processes, like methods for manufacturing a drug.71 But 
courts have always had some difficulty constraining the scope of that 
category, since in principle it could “embrace the broadest reaches of 
human experience.”72 In fact, as Professor Michael Risch has shown, 
business methods — including methods of teaching writing, a new 
musical notation, and a method of managing bees — were routinely 
patented in the early 1800s.73 
Modern expansionist views of the patent system stretched the 
subject matter categories even further. Some judicial interventions 
intended to make patents more readily available to new computer 
technologies have posed particular conceptual challenges in defining 
the scope of patentable subject matter, leading parties to claim patent 
protection for processes whose only connection to technology is that 
they are implemented by a computer.74 This expansion has loosened 
patent law’s connection to technological innovation, making it much 
harder to characterize patent law’s domain. Indeed, even outside of 
the software field, many patents have been granted on subject matter 
that clearly cannot be described as technological in any conventional 
sense.75 
It could, of course, be the utility requirement, rather than the sub-
ject matter categories, that imposes the technological framing. But 
despite a small number of utility cases that reject claimed inventions 
on the ground they don’t do anything,76 modern utility doctrine 
doesn’t meaningfully limit patent law’s domain.  
                                                                                                 
69. See examples in text accompanying footnotes 77–89, infra. 
70. See Section II.A, supra.  
71. Indeed, the original patent statute did not use the term “process,” instead including 
“arts,” a term linked more tightly to manual or industrial processes. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 
7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
72. Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 46, at 1139.  
73. Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1320–24 (2012) (not-
ing that most of the patented business methods did not use a machine or transform matter, 
though certain types of these method patents involved measurement and had some end use 
related to manufacturing).  
74. See Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 46 at 1153–55.  
75. See, e.g., text accompanying footnotes 120–26, infra (discussing patents for jewelry). 
76. Kevin Collins describes this requirement that the invention be functional, or “do 
something,” as an authorship screen, excluding from utility patent subject matter that be-
longs to copyright. See generally Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Authorship Screen 
(Feb. 9, 2017) (unpublished draft) (on file with authors). 
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Take the example of Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.77 In 
that case, the Federal Circuit upheld a patent on a post-mix beverage 
dispenser that was designed to look like a pre-mix beverage dispenser. 
“A ‘post-mix’ beverage dispenser stores beverage syrup concentrate 
and water in separate locations until the beverage is ready to be dis-
pensed.”78 A pre-mix beverage dispenser, on the other hand, pre-
mixes the syrup concentrate and water and the beverage is stored in a 
display reservoir bowl until it is ready to be dispensed.79 A pre-mix 
dispenser’s display bowl stimulates impulse buying, but it also creates 
the need to clean the bowl frequently because of bacterial build-up.80 
The patented dispenser had the appearance of a pre-mix dispenser but 
worked as a post-mix dispenser, avoiding the need for required 
maintenance.81 Plaintiff sued defendant claiming it was infringing on 
the patent. The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment, holding that an invention lacks utility when its only benefit 
is to make a product more salable.82  
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that “[t]he fact that one 
product can be altered to make it look like another is in itself a specif-
ic benefit sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility.”83 In 
so finding, the Federal Circuit cited other patents for which the rele-
vant utility was some psychological appeal, including those directed 
toward producing imitation grill marks on food, imitation wood floor-
ing, and imitation hamburger.84 Similarly, in Application of Miller,85 
the Federal Circuit’s predecessor found measuring cups marked with 
fractional cup gradations patentable subject matter because it helped 
alleviate the “mental strain” on cooks who were attempting to make 
fractional recipes.86  
It is possible to conceive of the utility of these inventions as tech-
nological, at least if you don’t look too hard. The invention in Juicy 
Whip certainly “did” something — it stored the beverage mixture and 
the water in separate locations and then mixed them together. It there-
fore achieved its purpose of making one thing look like another by 
                                                                                                 
77. 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
78. Id. at 1365.  
79. Id.  
80. Id.  
81. Id.  
82. Id.  
83. Id. at 1367.  
84. See id.; see also U.S. Patent No. 5,762,968 (issued June 9, 1998) (imitation grill 
marks); U.S. Patent No. 5,899,038 (issued May 4, 1999) (laminated flooring imitating 
wood); U.S. Patent No. 5,571,545 (issued Nov. 5, 1996) (imitation hamburger). Professor 
Collins refers to these patents as having “look like” functionality. Collins, supra note 76, at 
38–39.  
85. 418 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
86. Id. at 1394, 1396.  
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virtue of its mechanical design. Imitation wood flooring is clearly a 
tangible article of manufacture. Processes that create imitation grill 
marks have tangible output. But characterizing the utility of those in-
ventions as technological only highlights the emptiness of the concept 
of technological utility and its inability to meaningfully demarcate the 
domain of patent law. Marked measuring cups are certainly tangible 
and they are useful to cooks because they reduce mental strain. But 
jewelry designs and the designs on the back pockets of jeans are also 
tangible manufactures useful to their purchasers because they produce 
feelings of well-being, or perceptions of increased status, that shape 
consumers’ preferences in the markets for these products. Why is re-
ducing mental strain on cooks an acceptable form of utility while add-
ing commercial appeal to jeans is not? Tangibility provides no answer 
here. Measuring cup gradations and the stitching on jeans are equally 
tangible, and their mental effects are equally intangible — they are 
simply different types of mental effects.87 
Some of these patents, like the patent on the round beach towel 
discussed in the Seventh Circuit’s Jay Franco & Sons v. Franek88 
decision, also highlight the problem with conceiving of utility in terms 
of whether the invention “does” something. Often the utility of a 
manufacture is not in what it does but rather what consumers do with 
it. The round beach towel is useful not because it does anything, but 
because sunbathers are able to rotate their bodies around the towel 
along with the sun rather than having to move the towel.  
Despite these many examples of patent law’s openness to a wide 
range of subject matter, the sense that patent law is fundamentally 
about technological innovation runs deep, and for that reason courts 
have never been fully comfortable with expansive claiming of pro-
                                                                                                 
87. These two examples — marked measuring cups and stitching on the back pocket of 
jeans — are examples of why we think Professor Collins’s acknowledgement of “look like” 
patents doesn’t go far enough in capturing the under-theorization of functionality. Collins, 
supra note 76, at 38–39. A number of these patents do go to the “look” of an object, but 
they do not attempt to make one thing “look like” something else (as did the invention in 
Juicy Whip). The “function” of these inventions is entirely the production of mental effects 
of one sort or another. Indeed, as Collins identifies, the USPTO also regularly issues patents 
that merely claim “geometric configurations of space or mass without disclosing any con-
ceivable new function that the geometries perform (except satisfying consumers’ aesthetic 
preferences, of course).” Collins, supra note 76 at 53–54 (citing numerous issued patents). 
Collins suggests these patents were erroneously issued, but we think they are consistent with 
other “look” patents, particularly those for jewelry designs.  
88. 615 F.3d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 2010) (referring to U.S. Patent No. 4,794,029 as evidence 
of the functionality of the circular beach towel and noting that the patent claimed a “towel-
bag . . . wherein said towel is circular in shape, whereby a user while sunbathing may repo-
sition his or body towards the changing angle of the sun while the towel remains station-
ary”).  
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cesses.89 Until the latter part of the twentieth century, for example, 
most courts rejected patents on business methods “disconnected from 
the [tangible] means for carrying out” the methods.90 Courts in later 
years struggled to adapt this rule to the computer era,91 fumbling ini-
tially to distinguish patentable processes from mere algorithms. Tell-
ingly, it was the connection to the tangible machine that seemed to 
make all the difference.92 The Federal Circuit later characterized pa-
tentable methods as those that produced “a useful, concrete, and tan-
gible result”93 and found process claims invalid unless the process 
was tied to a particular machine or effected a physical transformation 
of a composition of matter or a manufacture.94  
Though the Supreme Court more recently held that the machine-
or-transformation test is not the sole criterion for deciding whether an 
invention is patent eligible,95 it has continued to be concerned about 
processes. In Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,96 the Court held 
that a claimed method for reducing non-payment risk in financial 
transactions was too abstract to be patented, and that the method was 
                                                                                                 
89. See Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 46, at 1143–47 (describing English and 
American courts’ discomfort with broad interpretations of process and their efforts to limit 
protection for processes to those with physical results).  
90. Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908); see also 
In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324, 327 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (“[I]t is sufficient to say that a system of 
transacting business, apart from the means for carrying out such system, is not within [pa-
tentable subject matter] . . .”); Rand, McNally & Co. v. Exchange Scrip-Book Co., 187 F. 
984, 986 (7th Cir. 1911) (requiring a “physical tangible facility” for practicing the technique 
in order for a process to be patentable); Ex parte Turner, 1894 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 36, 38 
(“[A] plan or theory of action which, if carried into practice, could produce no physical 
results proceeding directly from the operation of the theory or plan itself is not an art within 
the meaning of the patent laws.”). Infringement, even of method patents, also typically 
required the existence of a tangible device that performed the method. See Timothy R. 
Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1322–23 (2015) (discussing the historical anchoring of infringe-
ment to the physical); Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter 
for an Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 355–57, 360 (2002).  
91. Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 46, at 1148 (noting that “[t]he rise of com-
puter technology sorely tested” patent law’s “demand for physical structure” as a patent 
eligibility standard). 
92. See Katherine J. Strandburg, What If There Were a Business Method Use Exemption 
to Patent Infringement?, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 245, 254 (2008) (“As business methods 
were computerized, patents drawn to what might earlier have been deemed unpatentable 
methods of doing business slipped in under the guise of apparatus claims.”).  
93. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (emphasis added) (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).  
94. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
95. See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (“This Court’s precedents establish 
that the machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, 
for determining whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101. The machine-
or-transformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-
eligible ‘process.’”).  
96. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
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not saved from abstractness merely because it was implemented on a 
computer.97  
Despite Alice’s focus on abstraction, the Court failed to draw any 
perceptible line separating patentable processes from those that are 
too abstract; the lower courts will be forced to do that job.98 One no-
table early attempt can be found in the Federal Circuit’s recent Ultra-
mercial decision.99 In his concurrence in that case, Judge Mayer 
characterized the Supreme Court’s Alice decision as imposing a tech-
nological innovation requirement in § 101.100 Generally speaking, 
Judge Mayer wrote, “[i]n assessing patent eligibility, advances in non-
technological disciplines — such as business, law, or the social sci-
ences — simply do not count.”101  
The patent in Ultramercial was directed to a “method for distribu-
tion of products over the Internet” whereby a consumer was given 
access to “a media product” if the consumer viewed an ad.102 While 
the claim identified eleven steps, the court characterized it simply as 
“showing an advertisement before delivering free content” or “using 
                                                                                                 
97. Id. at 2357.  
98. Thus far, the majority of courts that have considered subject matter challenges to pro-
cess patents post-Alice have found the patents invalid. However, the rate of invalidation has 
decreased each year, suggesting that the weakest patents were litigated first, and that a new 
equilibrium is emerging. See Robert R. Sachs, Alice Brings a Mix of Gifts For 2016 Holi-
days, THE FENWICK & WEST BILSKI BLOG (Dec. 23, 2016) http://www.bilskiblog.com/ 
blog/2016/12/alice-brings-a-mix-of-gifts-for-2016-holidays.html [https://perma.cc/AM5C-
V5ZE]. Notably, however, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) which is a body 
within the USPTO that conducts proceedings on patent validity, including inter partes, post-
grant, and covered business method patent reviews and derivation proceedings, hears ap-
peals from adverse examiner decisions in patent applications and reexamination proceed-
ings, and renders decisions in interferences, continues to invalidate patents in covered 
business method disputes at a very high rate. Id. (showing rates of 84.6% for the PTAB’s 
institution of challenges to covered business method patents and 97.0% for invalidation at 
final decision). Selection effects seem very powerful here, however. See Mark Nowotarski, 
Surviving Alice in the Finance Arts, THE FENWICK & WEST BILSKI BLOG (Jan. 30, 2017) 
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2017/01/surviving-alice-in-the-finance-arts-1.html 
[https://perma.cc/LJ8Z-ECNL] (documenting a significant decline in allowances on applica-
tions in the finance art units, and showing that allowed applications nearly always incorpo-
rate a physical device into their claims). 
99. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
100. Id. at 721 (“Alice recognized that the patent system does not extend to all products 
of human ingenuity . . . [I]ts rewards do not flow to ideas — even good ones — outside of 
the technological arena.”) (citing Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2358–60).  
101. Id. In his concurrence in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010), Justice Stevens ar-
gued business methods were categorically unpatentable, not because they are necessarily 
abstract, but because they are business methods. Notably, however, Justice Stevens believed 
this limitation was part of the definition of a “process,” a category he took to exclude busi-
ness methods, noting that utility for conducting business did not count. Id. at 614 
(“[A]lthough a process is not patent ineligible simply because it is useful for conducting 
business, a claim that merely describes a method of doing business does not qualify as a 
‘process’ under § 101.”).  
102. Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 712. 
514  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 30 
 
advertising as an exchange or currency.”103 The court held that the 
claimed method was not patentable under Alice, as it was directed to 
the abstract idea “that one can use an advertisement as an exchange or 
currency,”104 and the claims did not transform that abstract idea into 
patent-eligible subject matter because they “simply instruct the practi-
tioner to implement the abstract idea with routine, conventional activi-
ty.”105 
Judge Mayer agreed that the claims were directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter, but he wrote separately, emphasizing that 
Alice articulated a “technological arts test” for patent eligibility, and 
that the asserted method and system claims were patent ineligible be-
cause they did not “improve the functioning of the computer itself” or 
“effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.”106  
Though it was only a concurrence, Judge Mayer’s opinion articu-
lated with unusual clarity a particular view of patent law’s domain. 
The Federal Circuit echoed that view in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Ho-
tels.com, L.P.,107 a case involving claims directed to systems and 
methods of generating a composite web page that combines certain 
visual elements of a host website with content of a third-party mer-
chant.108 The defendant in DDR Holdings argued that the claims recit-
ed abstract ideas ineligible for patent protection under the standards 
set by the Supreme Court in Alice and its prior opinion in Bilski v. 
Kappos.109 The Federal Circuit disagreed. It first attempted to set out 
the guidelines for ascertaining patent eligibility established in the two 
Supreme Court cases. In doing so, it identified the domain of patent, 
as Judge Mayer’s Ultramercial concurrence had done before it, with 
technological innovation:  
Distinguishing between claims that recite a patent-
eligible invention and claims that add too little to a 
patent-ineligible abstract concept can be difficult, as 
the line separating the two is not always clear. At 
one time, a computer-implemented invention was 
considered patent-eligible so long as it produced a 
“useful, concrete and tangible result.” This under-
standing rested, in large part, on the view that such 
inventions crossed the eligibility threshold by virtue 
                                                                                                 
103. Id. at 715.  
104. Id.  
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 721 (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2359 
(2014)).  
107. 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
108. Id. at 1245. 
109. Id. at 1257–59.  
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of being in the technological realm, the historical 
arena for patented inventions.110  
Having established the centrality of the technology criterion to 
patentability, the Federal Circuit found the claimed invention patent 
eligible. Unlike unpatentable abstract ideas that merely recite generic 
computer limitations, the claims at issue in DDR addressed a business 
challenge particular to the Internet.111 According to the court: 
[The DDR] claims st[ood] apart [from those courts 
had found ineligible] because they d[id] not merely 
recite the performance of some business practice 
known from the pre-Internet world along with the 
requirement to perform it on the Internet. Instead, the 
claimed solution [was] necessarily rooted in comput-
er technology in order to overcome a problem specif-
ically arising in the realm of computer networks.112 
This was not simply, as the dissent argued, application of the ab-
stract “store within a store” concept because that practice “did not 
have to account for the ephemeral nature of an Internet ‘location’ or 
the near-instantaneous transport between these locations made possi-
ble by standard Internet communication protocols, which introduces a 
problem that does not arise in the ‘brick and mortar’ context.”113 The 
invention was intimately related to the technology of the Internet.  
In sum, patent law drifted away from a focus on technological 
function (at least in part) during the period when business method 
patents were freely granted.114 But following the Supreme Court’s 
opinions in Bilski and Alice, at least some decisions of the Federal 
Circuit seem to be enforcing subject matter limitations in such a way 
that reconnects to a more explicitly technological understanding of 
patent eligibility. If this trend takes root, then the patent system’s pre-
viously largely implicit grounding in a certain sort of technological 
innovation will become more overt. By implication, so too will the 
exclusion from patent’s jurisdiction of, as Judge Mayer put it in Ul-
                                                                                                 
110. Id. at 1255 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
111. Id. at 1257 (“In particular, the ‘399 patent’s claims address the problem of retaining 
website visitors that, if adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyper-
link protocol, would be instantly transported away from a host’s website after ‘clicking’ on 
an advertisement and activating a hyperlink.”).  
112. Id.  
113. Id. at 1258.  
114. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,190,458 (issued March 2, 1993) (“Character Assessment 
Method”). 
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tramercial, “advances in nontechnological disciplines — such as 
business, law, or the social sciences.”115  
III. UTILITY PATENT’S DOMAIN IN CHANNELING DOCTRINES 
As we’ve seen, the law of utility patent has been unclear on a cen-
tral subject matter question — what sort of innovation counts? De-
spite widespread agreement that patent law focuses on technological 
innovation, patent doctrine enforces that understanding only incon-
sistently. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to extract from patent 
doctrine and practice any coherent sense of categorical limitations.  
That is odd because all of the other branches of IP act as if patent 
law’s domain is reasonably clear and stable. Indeed, one might say 
that the other branches of IP have accepted the rhetorical characteriza-
tion of utility patent law as focused on technological innovation, per-
haps having internalized that view of patent law before its modern 
expansions. For the most part — albeit, as we shall see, with some 
exception in the trademark cases — courts enforcing this view in non-
utility-patent IP cases have proceeded as if functionality is a straight-
forward empirical question. Rarely do they recognize, let alone 
acknowledge, functionality’s essential normativity. Features of de-
signs, trade dress, and works of authorship can be functional in a vari-
ety of ways. Sometimes features are technologically functional, in the 
sense that they “do work” in the world. Sometimes they are phenome-
nological, in the sense that they operate to change perceptions or pref-
erences. Are the latter also “functional”? Courts in non-utility-patent 
IP cases are approaching that question reductively and intuitively. In 
the process they are creating problems in the doctrine. The next sec-
tion discusses how design patent, trade dress, and copyright have ap-
proached the determination of whether particular product features are 
functional. 
A. Challenges in Design Patent 
Because utility patent law traditionally has been focused on tech-
nological innovation, the ornamental features of articles of manufac-
ture were understood to require a separate legal regime — design 
patent. The notion that ornamentality is the obverse of functionality is 
built into design patent’s subject matter rules. In defining the subject 
matter of design patent, courts have construed ornamental to mean 
non-functional, ostensibly to prevent parties from using design patent 
                                                                                                 
115. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 721 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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law to gain protection for the kinds of useful features that properly 
belong in utility patent.116  
Perhaps not surprisingly, neither utility nor design patent has con-
sistently been able to distinguish the functional and the ornamental. 
Design cannot categorically be excluded from utility patent because 
design features sometimes can be described in functional terms — 
when, for example, the shape of a machine affects its speed. In those 
cases, it might seem possible to describe separately the design’s tech-
nological utility (its effect on the machine’s speed) and its ornamen-
tality (the way the machine looks), even if they are inextricably 
intertwined. Thus, design may in some cases fit comfortably in utility 
patent’s domain. But that isn’t a complete explanation for utility pa-
tent law’s incursion into design; indeed, as the many utility patents on 
jewelry designs indicate,117 utility patent law only inconsistently rules 
out designs at the ornamental end of the spectrum. On its own, it’s 
possible that claiming of design features in utility patent isn’t that se-
rious of a concern. After all, design patent’s novelty and nonobvious-
ness requirements seem significantly less onerous than those of utility 
patent, so perhaps there isn’t much incentive to opt into utility patent 
rather than design patent.118  
Design patent law’s difficulty developing rules to channel func-
tional features to utility patent is of greater concern. There are a varie-
ty of reasons for that difficulty, and not all of them are the result of 
conceptual confusion about utility patent’s domain. One significant 
reason is that the distinction is pitched as an either/or — between 
functional features, on the one hand, and ornamental features on the 
other. Yet design defies that simple binary; the design of nearly every 
article of manufacture is, to a greater or lesser degree, both ornamen-
tal and functional (and indeed the same is true of the design of indi-
vidual product features as well).119 Design patent’s functionality 
doctrine, like trademark’s functionality doctrine and copyright’s use-
ful articles doctrine, really has to determine the point at which the 
balance between ornamentality and functionality tips too strongly in 
                                                                                                 
116. See McKenna & Strandburg, supra note 6, and cases cited. Sarah Burstein has re-
cently argued that ornamentality need not (and indeed should not) be reduced to non-
functionality. Burstein, supra note 37, at 1456. Burstein may be right, normatively, but as a 
descriptive matter ornamentality means non-functionality in current doctrine. 
117. See supra, Section II.B. 
118. See Dennis Crouch, Design Patent Rejections, PATENTLYO (Jan. 19, 2010), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/01/design-patent-rejections.html [https://perma.cc/3SQN-
2WXA] (finding a very low prior-art-based rejection rate on design patents of 1.2%, of 
which 61% were obviousness-based).  
119. See McKenna & Strandburg, supra note 6, at 46 (“The attempt to make a sharp dis-
tinction between the useful features of industrial designs . . . and their ornamental or aes-
thetic features . . . is doomed to failure because overall designs (as distinct from surface 
ornamentation) nearly always are, to a greater or lesser extent, both useful and aesthetic.”).  
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the direction of function. Yet because design patent law conceives of 
these characteristics in a binary way, it has no effective way of con-
ceptualizing or articulating the relevant tipping point.  
But even if the distinction were recalibrated to focus on the bal-
ance between functionality and ornamentality, this kind of channeling 
faces a more fundamental challenge. Ornamental features have a func-
tion, often simply because they contribute to a product’s appeal to 
consumers, either by provoking an emotional response or by shifting 
consumer preferences. As traditionally conceived, utility patent law 
does not focus on that kind of non-technological function. But that 
does not mean it does not exist. Because utility patent law deals with 
these questions at least partly on the basis of intuition and lacks a ful-
ly-specified and analytically robust account of the kinds of function 
that count, courts are apt to not be rigorous in policing the boundary 
line in their decisions about what’s in and what’s out.  
Take, for example, the recent decision in Prestige Jewelry.120 In 
that case, Prestige argued that the claimed design of diamond jewelry 
lacked ornamentality (in other words, was functional) because, the 
designer admitted, this arrangement “performed the best” in light box 
refraction tests, having “the best refraction.”121  
  
Figure 1: Images from Design Patent 618,132 from Prestige Jewelry 
The court rejected that argument, which it characterized as “in-
correctly blur[ring] the distinction between ornamental and functional 
designs.”122 Notwithstanding the designer’s statements about the per-
formance of the design, “the ultimate purpose of the [patented] design 
is to have a pleasing appearance — a quintessentially ornamental pur-
pose.”123 That does not change “simply because [the] inventor exper-
iment[ed] with alternative designs or use[d] rudimentary tools and 
                                                                                                 
120. Prestige Jewelry Int’l, Inc. v. BK Jewelry HK, No. 11-CV-2930-LAP, 2014 WL 
11344395 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2014). 
121. Id. at *9.  
122. Id. 
123. Id.  
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tests.”124 The design was “unquestionably ornamental” because it was 
“arranged solely to be pleasing to the eye.”125 According to the court, 
being pleasing to the eye is not the kind of function that belongs in 
utility patent law; it’s precisely the kind that belongs in design patent.  
Yet the USPTO has repeatedly allowed utility patents on inven-
tions with precisely this kind of function, in some cases allowing de-
sign and utility patents on the very same invention.126 Indeed, several 
of the pieces of prior art that the Prestige Jewelry court considered 
were utility patents that claimed nothing more than the arrangement of 
diamonds in a setting.127 Many cases have held that “the unique in-
ventive contribution reflected in an ornamental design can be identical 
to the unique inventive contribution of a mechanical process.”128  
This kind of uncertainty about the relevant functionality can be a 
serious problem because the ornamentality rule is, at least in signifi-
cant part, supposed to prevent parties from using design patent to gain 
protection for useful features without having to go through the more 
rigorous utility patent process. It could also be a problem if courts 
considering the validity of design patents were picking up on the func-
tional considerations inhering in many design decisions, ejecting from 
design patent a lot of industrial design innovations (assuming we 
could understand what “innovation” means in this context), and con-
signing those innovations to a utility patent system that is set up not to 
recognize them.  
The Federal Circuit has avoided this second difficulty by defining 
design patent’s functionality bar down to nearly nothing. Under the 
prevailing rule, design patent law disqualifies a claimed design only 
when the design, as a whole, is “dictated by” functional considera-
tions.129 In a few cases, the Federal Circuit has suggested that, in de-
termining whether a claimed design is functional under this standard, 
a court may consider several factors:  
 
                                                                                                 
124. Id.  
125. Id. 
126. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. D467,833 (issued Dec. 21, 2002); U.S. Patent No. 
7,146,827 (issued Dec. 12, 2006). The utility patent explains that the claimed “mixed cut 
gemstone enables the appreciation of the desirable characteristics of a diamond in ways that 
prior art cuts do not allow.” ‘827 Patent, at [57]. 
127. See U.S. Patent No. 7,762,104 (issued July 7, 2010). 
128. Wahl v. Rexnord, Inc., 624 F.2d 1169, 1179 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Transmatic, Inc. 
v. Gulton Indus., Inc., 601 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1979)); Ropat Corp. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 
535 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1976); Application of Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 536 (C.C.P.A. 
1969).  
129. See, e.g., PHG Techs., LLC v. St. John Cos, 469 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“The design of a useful article is deemed to be functional when the appearance of the 
claimed design is dictated by the use or purpose of the article.”) (quotations omitted) (quot-
ing L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  
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(1) Whether the protected design represents the best design;  
(2) Whether alternative designs would adversely affect the 
utility of the specified article;  
(3) Whether there are any concomitant utility patents;  
(4) Whether the advertising touts particular features of the de-
sign as having specific utility; and 
(5) Whether there are any elements in the design or an overall 
appearance clearly not dictated by function.130  
In general, however, courts in design patent cases have heavily 
emphasized the availability of alternative designs. If alternatives seem 
plausible, then the design in question is not dictated by its function. 
Not surprisingly, courts taking this approach have only very rarely 
found a claimed design to be functional. In fact, the Federal Circuit 
has, since its inception, considered the question of whether claimed 
features lack ornamentality more than thirty times. It has found the 
claimed design invalid on functionality grounds only five times, most 
recently in 2001.131 Most of the cases in which the Federal Circuit 
found functionality were also unique in some important way. Best 
Lock, for example, involved the design of a key blade, which of 
course must fit a corresponding lock in order to work.132  
Because the Federal Circuit has focused on alternative designs to 
determine whether a design is “dictated by function,” design patent 
courts rarely have to face squarely the decision of whether the claimed 
features belong in utility patent.133 But the cost of that avoidance is 
                                                                                                 
130. High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, Inc., 730 F.3d 1301, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (alterations in original) (quoting PHG Techs., 469 F.3d at 1366). These factors are 
highly reminiscent of the Federal Circuit’s Morton-Norwich factors, which it uses to assess 
functionality in the trade dress context. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 
1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (determining functionality by considering: (1) the existence of an 
expired utility patent; (2) whether the designer “touts the utilitarian advantages through 
advertising”; (3) the availability of alternative designs; and (4) whether the design results 
from a “simple or cheap method” of manufacture). Notably, those factors were inspired by 
the competitive necessity view of functionality the Supreme Court downplayed in TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001).  
131. Five Star Mfg., Inc. v. Ramp Lite Mfg., Inc., 4 Fed. App’x 922, 922 (Fed. Cir. 
2001); In re Chung, No. 00-1148, 2000 WL 1476861, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 4, 2000); Berry 
Sterling Corp. v. Pescor Plastics, Inc., No. 98-1381, 1999 WL 674514, at *3–4 (Fed. Cir. 
Aug. 30, 1999); Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1566–67 (Fed Cir. 
1996); Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234, 238–240 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
The Federal Circuit remanded on the issue in two other cases. See PHG Techs., 469 F.3d at 
1369; Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 955 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990).  
132. See Best Lock, 94 F.3d at 1566.  
133. See Perry J. Saidman, The Demise of the Functionality Doctrine in Design Patent 
Law, _ NOTRE DAME L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2017) (draft at 24) (noting that, “if the func-
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that design patents are available to many designs with clear techno-
logically functional characteristics. As a result, design patent, with 
novelty and non-obviousness requirements that are pitched lower than 
utility patent’s, may be used to circumvent utility patent and protect a 
wide range of design innovations that an ordinary observer would 
recognize as useful.  
To a limited extent, the Federal Circuit has tried to remedy that 
looseness at the validity stage by allowing courts to consider func-
tionality when assessing infringement — essentially limiting the 
scope of a party’s rights by discounting similarities that can be ex-
plained in terms of function. In Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc.,134 
the Federal Circuit effectively endorsed a sort of abstraction/filtration 
approach analogous to what some copyright courts have employed to 
divide expressive from functional elements in software code.135 The 
Richardson court construed the design patent claims in light of “the 
distinction between the functional and ornamental aspects of a de-
sign”136 and then assessed the similarity between the accused design 
(right) and the plaintiff’s patented design (left) only after having ac-
counted for the functionality of the features of the design.137  
  
  
Figure 2: The Patented Design (left) and the Accused Design (right) 
But even if this were generally an adequate way of accounting for 
functionality, subsequent decisions have seriously undermined Rich-
ardson. For one thing, courts have had trouble with the filtering ap-
proach in cases in which claim construction and infringement are 
addressed at different stages (which is the majority of cases).138 The 
                                                                                                 
tion of a claimed design is defined in general, broad terms, there will always be alternatives 
that can perform substantially the same function and not look like the patented design. That 
is true even for the simplest of designs.”). 
134. 597 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
135. See, e.g., Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
136. Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1293.  
137. Id. at 1296 (“We also agree that, ignoring the functional elements of the tools, the 
two designs are indeed different.”); see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 
796 F.3d 1312, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (construing the claimed design to eliminate the func-
tional aspects of the design).  
138. See, e.g., Weber-Stephen Prods. LLC v. Sears Holding Corp., 2014 WL 5333364, at 
*10 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2014) (“[U]nlike the typical case, the Richardson trial court was able 
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even greater difficulty can be traced to design patent’s current in-
fringement standard, which does not explicitly focus on the protecta-
ble features of the claimed design. Since the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in Egyptian Goddess v. Swisa,139 infringement has been evaluated by 
asking “whether an ordinary observer, familiar with the prior art, 
would be deceived into thinking that the accused design was the same 
as the patented design.”140 Before Egyptian Goddess, courts account-
ed for the so-called “point of novelty” in making this comparison, 
finding infringement only if the accused design incorporated novel 
and nonobvious aspects of the patentee’s claimed design.141 Several 
cases had extended that rule to account for functionality.142 But Egyp-
tian Goddess expressly repudiated the point of novelty test, holding 
that the ordinary observer test is the sole test for determining in-
fringement,143 even when “the patented design incorporates numerous 
functional elements.”144  
Perhaps more significantly, courts have not interpreted Richard-
son’s approach to be particularly constraining. In Apple v. Sam-
sung,145 for example, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s 
jury instructions, which did not require the jury to exclude the func-
tional elements of the designs when assessing substantial similarity.146 
According to the Federal Circuit:  
[T]he claim construction in Richardson did not ex-
clude those components in their entirety. Rather, the 
claim construction included the ornamental aspects 
of those components: “the standard shape of the 
hammer-head, the diamond-shaped flare of the crow-
bar and the top of the jaw, the rounded neck, the ori-
                                                                                                 
to consider claim construction and functionality together, with the benefit of a fully devel-
oped record at trial.”).  
139. 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
140. Id. at 672.  
141. Id. at 670–71.  
142. See, e.g., Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[I]t 
is the non-functional, design aspects that are pertinent to determinations of infringement.”). 
143. Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678.  
144. Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The Fed-
eral Circuit has also concluded that the point of novelty is no longer relevant to design pa-
tent validity either. See, e.g., Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 
1233, 1237–38 (Fed. Cir. 2009). For a critique of the Federal Circuit’s rejection of the point 
of novelty, see Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1253 (2011).  
145. 786 F.3d 983 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
146. Id. at 983.  
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entation of the crow-bar relative to the head of the 
tool, and the plain, undecorated handle.”147  
Moreover, “the language ‘dictated by their functional purpose’ in 
Richardson was only a description of the facts there; it did not estab-
lish a rule to eliminate entire elements from the claim scope.”148 Thus, 
the ordinary observer need not ignore utilitarian aspects of the prod-
ucts in comparing the designs. Indeed, the court also deemed it unnec-
essary to instruct jury members to compare only the ornamental 
appearance of the accused product with the claimed design, as long as 
the instructions “as a whole” informed them that the patents claimed 
“the ornamental design” of the devices.149 That is, of course, no con-
straint at all, since it merely repeats statutory subject matter of design 
patents.  
In summary, despite acknowledgement that design patent law 
should not allow parties to protect functional features without having 
to traverse the more stringent utility patent standards, in practice 
courts have largely avoided the difficult task of defining the types of 
function that belong to utility patent. They have done so by defining 
the functionality doctrine so narrowly that hardly anything is disquali-
fied from design patent protection on that basis. But as the Prestige 
Jewelry case demonstrates, when confronted with the question of 
what kinds of function counts, design patent courts distinguish be-
tween technological function (which, at least in principle, raises con-
cerns) and other functions (which do not).150  
B. Trade Dress Functionality 
Trademark law refuses protection to functional features, which 
the Supreme Court has defined as features that are “essential to the 
use or purpose of the article” or “affect[] the [article’s] cost or quali-
ty.”151 The reasons for doing so have long been the subject of some 
                                                                                                 
147. Id. at 998 (quoting Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 
(D. Ariz. 2009)).  
148. Id.  
149. Id. at 999. See also Sport Dimension, Inc. v. The Coleman Co., 820 F.3d 1316, 1323 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (acknowledging that certain elements of the claimed design served a useful 
purpose, but rejecting the district court’s construction and refusing to eliminate those ele-
ments from the claim, instructing the fact finder not to “focus on the particular designs of 
these elements when determining infringement, but rather focus on what these elements 
contribute to the design’s overall ornamentation”).  
150. Prestige Jewelry Int’l, Inc. v. BK Jewelry HK, No. 11-CV-2930-LAP, 2014 WL 
11344395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2014). 
151. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001) (quot-
ing Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).  
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debate,152 but the modern justification, reflected in the Supreme 
Court’s TrafFix decision, focuses on the relationship between trade-
mark and patent law.153 Functional features are refused trademark 
protection because those features should be protected, if at all, only by 
the utility patent system.154  
At the extreme, some trademark courts have reduced the func-
tionality question to whether the features alleged to be functional were 
in fact claimed in a utility patent.155 Most courts, however, have un-
derstood functionality to be a broader inquiry about whether the fea-
tures at issue are useful, for which the existence of a patent is just 
good evidence.156 Because they believe that trademark’s exclusion of 
functional features aims primarily to ensure that trademark stays out 
of patent law’s way, these courts have focused on the types of utility 
that they believe are the province of utility patent law:  
So if a design enables a product to operate, or im-
proves on a substitute design in some way (such as 
by making the product cheaper, faster, lighter, or 
stronger), then the design cannot be trademarked; it 
is functional because consumers would pay to have it 
rather than be indifferent toward or pay to avoid it.157  
This is the doctrine of utilitarian (or mechanical) functionality, 
and the reference to making a product “cheaper, faster, lighter, or 
stronger” is characteristic.  
It is, of course, not inevitable that the law would have evolved 
this way. In the early to middle part of the twentieth century, most 
courts (and, most significantly, the Supreme Court) took a more cate-
gorical approach, excluding the design of a product from trademark 
protection altogether. While that categorical approach also aimed to 
differentiate the domains of trademark law and patent law, it did not 
depend on determinations of the utility of the features at issue. In-
                                                                                                 
152. See Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)Functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 825–26 (2012).  
153. See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 34–35.  
154. See, e.g., Kellogg v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119 (1938) (“The patented 
machines used were designed to produce only the pillow-shaped biscuits. And a design 
patent was taken out to cover the pillow-shaped form. Hence, upon expiration of the pa-
tents the form, as well as the name, was dedicated to the public.”); Singer Mfg. Co. v. June 
Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896) (“[O]n the termination of the patent there passes to the 
public the right to make the machine in the form in which it was constructed during the 
patent.”).  
155. See Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pacific Bay Int’l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 687 (6th Cir. 
2006).  
156. See Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 857 (7th Cir. 2010); Special-
ized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 616 F.3d 722, 726–27 (7th Cir. 2010).  
157. Jay Franco & Sons, 615 F.3d at 857.  
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stead, these cases uniformly held that competitors had a general right 
to copy unpatented product features158 because those features “pro-
vide the baseline of free competition upon which the patent system’s 
incentive to creative effort depends.”159 As a result, parties could not 
restrain copying of unpatented features; they could only call on unfair 
competition law to require labeling in order to avoid passing off.160  
Importantly, “unpatented” in these cases meant free from protec-
tion under either utility or design patent.161 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
made many of its most famous pronouncements about the importance 
of copying to competition in cases that involved design patents.162 In 
Sears, the Stiffel Company asserted infringement of both utility and 
design patents, as well as unfair competition. The patent claims fell 
out of the case on appeal after the district court found the patents inva-
lid.163 Likewise in Compco, Day-Brite originally alleged design patent 
infringement in addition to unfair competition.164 The design patent 
claim was no longer at issue at the Supreme Court level only because 
the Seventh Circuit had affirmed the district court’s finding that the 
design patent was invalid on the ground that the design was function-
al.165 Thus, the conflict with which the Supreme Court was concerned 
in those cases included a conflict with design patent, not just utility 
patent (and in the case of Compco, the only conflict was with design 
patent).166 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,167 on which 
the Court relied in TrafFix, explicitly equated the social bargains in-
volved in utility and design patenting, noting with respect to both that 
“[t]he attractiveness of [the patent] bargain, and its effectiveness in 
                                                                                                 
158. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989); 
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237–38 (1964), rev’g 311 F.2d 26 
(7th Cir. 1963) [hereinafter Compco]; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 
231–32 (1964); Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 116–17; Singer Mfg., 163 U.S. at 185.  
159. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156; see also McKenna, supra note 152, at 840–43.  
160. See McKenna, supra note 152, at 836–43.  
161. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 648 (7th Cir. 1993) (Cudahy, J., dissent-
ing). For a detailed exploration of this dissent and its context, see Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Rounding the Corner on Trade Dress: A Tribute to the Jurisprudence of Judge Richard D. 
Cudahy, 29 YALE J. REG. 387 (2012).  
162. See, e.g., Sears, 376 U.S. at 225; Compco, 376 U.S. at 234.  
163. Sears, 376 U.S. at 226.  
164. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 27 (7th Cir. 1963), rev’d 
Compco, 376 U.S. 234 [hereinafter Day-Brite Lighting]. 
165. See Day-Brite Lighting, 311 F.2d at 28 (“The District Court’s decision that the de-
sign of the cross ribs was functional and dictated by the limitations of the manufacturing 
process is fully supported by the evidence.”).  
166. See Compco, 376 U.S. at 234, 237–38 (“[T]he trial court found that the configura-
tion of Day-Brite’s fixture identified Day-Brite to the trade because the arrangement of the 
ribbing had, like a trademark, acquired a ‘secondary meaning’ . . . But if the design is not 
entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory protection, then it can be copied at 
will.”). 
167. 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
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inducing creative effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, 
depend almost entirely on a backdrop of free competition in the ex-
ploitation of unpatented designs and innovations.”168  
Because these courts were not uniquely focused on a conflict with 
utility patent law, the exclusions these courts developed did not de-
pend on some characterization of the features at issue — in particular 
they did not depend on a determination that the features were func-
tional. As the Court said in Compco: 
That an article copied from an unpatented article 
could be made in some other way, that the design is 
“nonfunctional” and not essential to the use of either 
article, that the configuration of the article copied 
may have a “secondary meaning” which identifies 
the maker to the trade, or that there may be 
“confusion” among purchasers as to which article is 
which or as to who is the maker, may be relevant 
evidence in applying a State’s law requiring such 
precautions as labeling; however, and regardless of 
the copier’s motives, neither these facts nor any 
others can furnish a basis for imposing liability for or 
prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling.169 
This approach therefore did not depend in any significant way on 
courts’ ability to determine what belonged in utility patent law, so that 
they could keep those features out of trademark law.  
As courts began interpreting the Lanham Act to extend a federal 
cause of action for unregistered marks, including trade dress, they 
began to regard the Sears/Compco line of cases primarily in preemp-
tion terms.170 The issue in Sears and Compco was the conflict be-
tween the patent laws and unfair competition. Because, after the Erie 
decision, courts understood unfair competition claims to arise under 
state law,171 when courts began accepting that trade dress infringe-
ment could be remedied under the Lanham Act, Sears and Compco no 
longer seemed directly on point.172 The issue was then whether one 
                                                                                                 
168. Id. at 151.  
169. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.  
170. See William McGeveran & Mark P. McKenna, Confusion Isn’t Everything, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 268–70 (2013) (explaining these developments).  
171. See Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. Nat’l Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666, 667 (1942) (“The only 
cause of action that [the] record could possibly support is for unfair competition and com-
mon law ‘trademark infringement,’ to which local law applies.”).  
172. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining “no Lan-
ham Act issue was raised in either Sears or Compco” and “the Court in Compco noted that a 
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federal law limited another. To courts that might otherwise have been 
inclined to expand protection, that served as an opening to adopt a 
different approach — one that was more consistent with the emerging 
practice of the Trademark Office, which was registering product con-
figurations as trademarks.173 Not surprisingly, courts in the decades 
following began focusing their exclusion doctrines on functionality — 
a much less categorical approach that required a methodology for 
evaluating the nature of the features.  
Implicit — and sometimes explicit — in the terminology of this 
reframing was a narrowing of the way courts perceived the conflict 
with patent law. Whereas earlier cases worried about conflict with 
both utility and design patent law, the language of functionality de-
moted and then erased any concern about possible conflict with de-
sign patent. Going forward, the only kinds of features that would be 
excluded were functional ones, and functionality was taken as focus-
ing on technologically useful features and not ornamental features. 
Indeed, as the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”), 
the predecessor court to the Federal Circuit, ruled in In re Morton-
Norwich Prods., Inc.,174 “functional means utilitarian.”175  
It is worth noting that many courts, influenced by the CCPA’s de-
cision in Morton-Norwich, came to evaluate whether particular fea-
tures were functional by asking whether the features were 
competitively necessary.176 It seems quite clear that, aside from wish-
ing to limit the extent to which functionality barred protection, these 
courts treated competitive need as indicative of functionality because 
they assumed that only utilitarian features imposed real competitive 
                                                                                                 
defendant may copy at will if the design is ‘not entitled to a patent or other federal statutory 
protection’”) (quoting Compco, 376 U.S. at 238).  
173. Indeed, the Trademark Office was registering product configuration contemporane-
ously with Sears and Compco. See Application of Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836 
(C.C.P.A. 1964).  
174. 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
175. Id. at 1338. The Morton-Norwich court traced that thinking to some earlier twentieth 
century registration decisions that had held that “the configuration of an article having 
utility is not the subject of trade-mark protection.” Id. (citing In re Dennison Mfg. Co., 39 
F.2d 720, 720 (C.C.P.A. 1930)). Those cases did indeed talk in terms of utility, but they 
meant that articles having utility overall could not be registered — not that features would 
be individually evaluated to determine their particular utility. In that respect, though they 
used the language of utility, they were more like Sears and Compco in their approach. In-
deed, that is why Morton-Norwich insisted that later cases had moved away from the ques-
tion of whether the article has utility and had focused on whether the particular features did. 
See Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1338 (noting that the question of functionality is in refer-
ence to the design of the article, not to the utility of the article itself).  
176. Id. at 1339 (“[C]ourts in the past have considered the public policy involved in this 
area of the law as, not the right to slavishly copy articles which are not protected by patent 
or copyright, but the need to copy those articles, which is more properly termed the right to 
compete effectively.”) (emphasis in original). 
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harm.177 Implicit in this view is that features that are not useful in a 
technological sense are not valued by consumers in a way that makes 
them competitively significant.  
Nevertheless, the language of the test these courts used focused 
on competitive need and not specifically on the utilitarian nature of 
the features. And it turned out that in some cases it was obvious that 
features that were not technologically useful could nonetheless be 
described as competitively important or even necessary. Most signifi-
cantly, these features might have been necessary because they made 
products more aesthetically appealing or otherwise more attractive to 
consumers. As Judge Easterbrook memorably put it, “[f]ashion is a 
form of function. A design’s aesthetic appeal can be as functional as 
its tangible characteristics.”178 This is the doctrine of aesthetic func-
tionality, and it is one the Supreme Court has clearly embraced.179  
So trademark came, to some extent, to recognize other functions, 
but not comfortably. Indeed, there remains significant resistance to the 
wider vision of functionality. The persistent claims by many courts 
and leading commentators that aesthetic functionality is an oxymoron 
reflect the deep sense that, despite having formulated the test in terms 
of competitive need, there really is something to the nomenclature of 
functionality. Function here means something particular about the 
way a product works, something technological rather than phenome-
nological.180 Indeed, Professor McCarthy goes so far as to say that the 
                                                                                                 
177. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 7:81 (4th ed. 2016) (“[T]he range of possible aesthetic designs and configu-
rations is as infinite as are the tastes that desire them, [so] according trademark protection to 
aesthetic features would not greatly hinder competition.”) (quoting Deborah J. Krieger, The 
Broad Sweep of Aesthetic Functionality: A Threat to Trademark Protection of Aesthetic 
Product Features, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 380 (1982)); see also Kohler, 12 F.3d at 648 
(Cudahy, J., dissenting) (“The argument for distinguishing between the subjects of design 
and utility patents is that, although freedom to copy functional features may be essential to 
competition, freedom to copy aesthetic features is not essential.”) (citing W.T. Rogers Co. v. 
Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that trademark protection for “ornamental, 
fanciful shapes and patterns” does not hinder competition)).  
178. Jay Franco & Sons, Inc. v. Franek, 615 F.3d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 2010).  
179. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001). 
TrafFix was concerned with the functionality of a dual-spring design for road signs — what 
most courts refer to as “utilitarian” or “mechanical” functionality. But in articulating the 
relevant rule (that features are functional when they are essential to the use or purpose of an 
article, or affect the article’s cost or quality), the Court expressly distinguished cases of 
aesthetic functionality, saying that the proper test in those cases is whether exclusive use of 
the feature would put competitors at a significant, non-reputation-related disadvantage. Id. 
(“It is proper to inquire into a ‘significant non-reputation-related disadvantage’ in cases of 
esthetic functionality . . .”).  
180. See, e.g., Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“[T]rade dress cannot be both ‘functional and purely aesthetic.’ Such a formulation 
is internally inconsistent and at odds with the commonly accepted view that functionality 
denotes utility.”); Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd. v. Landroll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 339 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(noting that the merger of the utilitarian and the aesthetic is “mischievously vague”).  
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concept of aesthetic functionality makes no sense because “ornamen-
tal aesthetic designs are the antithesis of utilitarian designs.”181 Thus, 
the tacit adoption of patent law’s traditional technological framing of 
utility underlies trademark law’s continuing struggle with the concept 
of aesthetic functionality. Many courts simply cannot accept that there 
is such a thing as aesthetic functionality because they understand the 
concept to be focused on features with the kind of utility that belongs 
in utility patent law.182  
Even when courts accept the concept of aesthetic functionality, 
they use a different test for it than they do for utilitarian functionality. 
They do so because they see aesthetic functionality as having a differ-
ent purpose. Whereas TrafFix took the emphasis off of competitive 
need in the utilitarian functionality context, it doubled down on com-
petitive need as the relevant consideration for aesthetic functionali-
ty.183 The Court seemed to simply assume, without discussion, that 
aesthetic or ornamental features would not fall under Inwood’s rule 
that trade dress protection is unavailable for a feature that “is essential 
to the use or purpose of the article or . . . affects the cost or quality of 
the article.”184 As a result, unlike in the Sears/Compco era, the out-
come of a trademark case can depend significantly on whether a court 
                                                                                                 
181. MCCARTHY, supra note 177, at § 7:81. 
182. The Fifth Circuit has notoriously rejected the doctrine of aesthetic functionality al-
together. Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel 
Co., 550 F.3d 465, 487 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Our circuit has consistently rejected the concept of 
aesthetic functionality.”); see also id. at 487–88 (“We do not believe that the Court’s dictum 
in TrafFix requires us to abandon our long-settled view rejecting recognition of aesthetic 
functionality.”). Other courts are more equivocal. See Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio v. Roberts, 
944 F.2d 1235, 1246–47 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he precedent in this circuit suggests that aes-
thetic functionality will not preclude a finding of non-functionality where the design also 
indicates source.”); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Rich, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t is arguable that there is no ‘doctrine’ of aesthetic functionality which 
stands alone, without consideration of the more traditional source identification principles of 
trademark law. To the extent that there may be — at least with respect to ex parte prosecu-
tion practice — it has been previously rejected by this court.”).  
183. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 23 (holding that the appropriate inquiry in cases of aesthetic 
functionality is whether “exclusive use of [the claimed] feature would put competitors at a 
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage”). Today’s aesthetic functionality doctrine 
also treats utility patents and design patents entirely differently. For example, while TrafFix 
made no explicit reference to design patents, the Court suggested that it might be possible to 
“carry the heavy burden of showing that [a feature claimed in a utility patent] is not func-
tional, for instance by showing that it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary as-
pect of the device.” Id. at 30 (emphasis added).  
184. Id. at 32 (quoting Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 
(1982)). Lower courts have entrenched differential treatment of design and utility patents in 
other ways as well. Most significantly, while TrafFix made clear that utility patents are 
strong evidence of functionality, many courts have held that design patents covering the 
features at issue are evidence that the design is “ornamental,” rather than “functional” — 
and hence weigh against a finding of functionality. See, e.g., In re Becton Dickson and Co., 
675 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (applying In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 
F.2d 1332, 1342 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).  
530  Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 30 
 
sees the relevant features as useful — thereby triggering the (now rel-
atively harsh) rules for utilitarian functionality — or as something 
else, thereby triggering, if anything, the narrower “significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage” inquiry into competitive effect.  
C. Copyright’s Exclusion of Ideas, Systems, and Useful Things185 
Like trademark and design patent law, copyright law purports to 
exclude useful things. Like those other areas of IP law, copyright’s 
efforts to draw a stable and predictable line between expressive and 
useful things has produced continuing difficulties — difficulties that 
can be traced in part to copyright’s attempt, without a clear under-
standing of patent law’s own concept of its domain, to send to patent 
subject matter which it believes belongs there. To trace that develop-
ment, we must begin with a bit of history.  
From its inception, copyright has faced difficult questions about 
how to treat functional things, which it has never fully excluded from 
its domain. This was true of the first 1790 Copyright Act,186 which 
extended copyright protection to just three forms of subject matter — 
books, maps, and charts (i.e., maps of water).187 Two of the three cat-
egories of original subject matter — maps and charts — have obvious 
function in the sense that they help people navigate the physical 
world. So, from its beginning, copyright has reached subject matter 
that is appreciated not simply for its value as expression but also — in 
the case of maps and charts, overwhelmingly — because it is useful.  
Founding-era copyright law may have seemed unconcerned with 
the inclusion of useful things, but it didn’t remain so. As early as 
1880, in its seminal opinion in Baker v. Selden,188 the Supreme Court 
drew lines between protectable expression and unprotectable useful 
ideas.189 As copyright’s subject matter expanded to include three-
dimensional sculptural works, a category that could include most of 
the field of industrial design, copyright’s entanglement with function-
ality deepened.  
Copyright has employed two primary doctrines to distinguish be-
tween protectable expression and unprotectable utility: (1) the idea-
expression distinction, and (2) the so-called useful articles doctrine. 
The following Sections will examine each in turn.  
                                                                                                 
185. Portions of this Section are adapted from McKenna & Strandburg, supra note 6.  
186. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
187. Id.  
188. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).  
189. Id. at 101–02. 
No. 2] What’s In, and What’s Out 531 
 
1. The Idea-Expression Distinction  
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act provides “[i]n no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, prin-
ciple, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”190 The exclusion 
from copyright of ideas (including concepts and principles), facts 
(discoveries), and various types of systems (procedures, processes, 
methods of operation) functions in part to establish the boundary be-
tween copyright and patent — in essence, by remanding to patent 
things like systems that are patentable if novel, non-obvious, and use-
ful. The exclusion also establishes, in part, the boundary between 
copyright and the public domain. For example, it sends to the public 
domain ideas, concepts and principles that lack novelty or are too 
foundational to patent (such as laws of nature).191 What is reserved to 
copyright — original expression that does not involve any of the ex-
cluded categories — is known only via reverse implication.  
Two primary difficulties have attended courts’ application of the 
102(b) exclusion. First, the categories are not self-defining, and courts 
have struggled to decide whether a particular piece of subject matter 
belongs within one of the excluded categories or not. Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, courts have dealt inconsistently with things 
that lie within the excluded categories but are nonetheless expressive. 
Some courts have held that the exclusion applies even to very creative 
systems and ideas. Others have focused on the creativity and refused 
to exclude the disputed subject matter from copyright. 
American Dental Ass’n. v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n.192 is an ex-
ample of the first difficulty. That case involved the copyrightability of 
a code invented by the American Dental Association (“ADA”) that 
was used to identify dental procedures. The ADA code is highly use-
ful — it improves the efficiency of dental billing. Dentists using the 
code produce standardized bills, which reduces the time and labor 
required for insurance companies to process and pay.193 Delta Dental, 
an insurance company, published a billing guide that copied most of 
the ADA’s code, and the ADA sued.194 Judge Easterbrook reversed a 
district court judgment holding that the ADA code was an uncopy-
                                                                                                 
190. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).  
191. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1296–97 
(2012) (finding that correlation between a drug’s metabolite and levels of that drug present 
in a patient’s blood is an unpatentable law of nature). 
192. 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).  
193. Id. at 981.  
194. Id. at 977.  
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rightable taxonomy (i.e., a system for naming things). According to 
Judge Easterbrook, the ADA code was copyrightable because it was 
creative, and it was not a system excluded from copyright protec-
tion.195  
What was the creativity involved in the code? The ADA orga-
nized dental procedures into groups, assigned long and short linguistic 
descriptions to each, and also assigned each a 5-digit number. But 
what sort of creativity is this? The aim of the ADA’s creative work 
was not to be expressive — the ADA code is not a poem or a song or 
even a computer program — but rather to be useful to dentists and 
insurance companies in the enterprise of making and paying dental 
insurance claims. According to the IP system’s own logic, patent is 
the domain of creative choice that produces utility. The code is, in 
short, a system.  
Judge Easterbrook considered this possibility in Delta Dental, but 
he rejected it, highlighting the fact that, while § 102(b) excludes sys-
tems, that term is not defined in the Copyright Act.  
Delta asks us to affirm the judgment on [the] 
ground . . . that the Code is not copyrightable 
because it is a “system.” . . . But what could it mean 
to call the Code a ‘system’? This taxonomy does not 
come with instructions for use, as if the Code were a 
recipe for a new dish.196  
For Judge Easterbrook, systems are defined by the presence of in-
structions for use.  
We grant that it may be easier for courts to identify and exclude a 
system when a case also involves instructions that may be distin-
guished from the system itself. Indeed, the distinction between in-
structions and systems goes all the way back to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Baker v. Selden,197 which held Selden’s instructions for the 
use of his accounting system copyrightable but excluded from protec-
tion the system that the book explained.198 But that doesn’t demon-
                                                                                                 
195. Id. at 980–81.  
196. Id.  
197. 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
198. Id. at 104. It is worth noting that in a couple of cases that are very similar to Delta 
Dental, courts excluded from copyright protection numbering systems and the numbers they 
produced. For example, in ATC Distribution Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions 
& Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 707 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit found that a classification 
scheme for organizing auto transmission parts was a system excluded by 102(b) — the 
scheme itself contained nothing but uncopyrightable ideas. Moreover, the expression of that 
classification system in the contents of ATC’s parts catalog was also excluded because it 
merged into the system. Id. 
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strate that systems must have instructions, only that systems and in-
structions are different things. Since systems are excluded from copy-
right because they are thought to be the province of utility patent law, 
utility patent law would have been the natural place to look for a defi-
nition of systems. Unfortunately, as we’ve seen, patent law is particu-
larly unclear in this respect.  
This brings us to the second difficulty with § 102(b)’s separation 
of useful from expressive — courts have divided over whether the 
§ 102(b) exclusions are categorical, in the sense that anything that 
falls within one or more of the categories is excluded, or conditional, 
in the sense that a thing that falls within an excluded category may 
nonetheless be admitted if it is creative. The difference is profoundly 
important. If the § 102(b) categories are categorical, then all systems, 
processes, and methods of operation will be remanded to patent, and, 
to be protected, will have to meet patent’s stiff entry conditions. If, on 
the other hand, copyright’s § 102(b) exclusions are conditional, then 
copyright will protect a much wider range of useful things and the 
domain of copyright and patent will overlap substantially. 
The Federal Circuit treated § 102(b) as conditional in its opinion 
in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.199 In that case, Oracle claimed 
that Google violated Oracle’s copyrights in its Java Application Pro-
gram Interfaces (“APIs”) when the Internet search giant included Ora-
cle’s declaring code in the implementation of Java that it uses in its 
Android mobile operating system.200 Oracle’s declaring code names 
each operation (or “method”) contained in the APIs and defines how 
the methods are organized within Java. The declaring code allows 
developers to create references to the API methods in their software 
code, which references in turn tell the computer where to go to run the 
methods. API methods are invoked in a particular format — ja-
va.package.Class.method() — which mirrors the organization of the 
declaring code. Therefore, the APIs can be used in any Java project as 
long as the declaring code stays constant. 
The actual functionality of a method is defined by the method’s 
implementing code, which consists of the step-by-step instructions the 
computer follows to carry out the declared operation. And yet the de-
claring code is the key to the utility of the APIs. The purpose of the 
Java APIs is to define in advance a set of common operations that 
programmers can use in their software without having to know the 
implementing code and re-write it in every project. Instead, all a pro-
grammer needs to know to execute a function is the declaring code. 
Using the command structure defined by the declaring code results in 
                                                                                                 
199. 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
200. Id. at 1347.  
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the programmer’s software operating the method from the APIs. So it 
seems plain that the declaring code — which was the only code that 
Google copied — is an uncopyrightable method of operation. It is a 
useful thing that, if it is to be protected at all, belongs to patent.  
In attempting to avoid this conclusion, Oracle took a page from 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Delta Dental and argued that the de-
claring code was not a method of operation, but rather a taxonomy — 
that is, a system for naming things. In Oracle’s view, taxonomies may 
be copyrighted if, like Java’s declaring code, they are creative.201 
There is nothing inevitable, Oracle asserted, about the specific ja-
va.package.Class.method() arrangement of Oracle’s Java opera-
tions — Oracle’s programmers could have chosen some other 
structure or naming convention for its declaring code without affect-
ing their functionality.202  
A district judge rejected Oracle’s argument, but the Federal Cir-
cuit accepted it on appeal. The appellate court acknowledged that Java 
declaring code was indeed a method of operation but held that “the 
[copyright] protection accorded a particular expression of an idea” is 
not extinguished “merely because that expression is embodied in a 
method of operation.”203 In other words, in the Federal Circuit’s view, 
if the implementation of a particular method of operation involves 
some creative choice, then it will be copyrightable.  
There are two things to say about the Federal Circuit’s ruling in 
Oracle v. Google. First, it is in considerable tension with the language 
of § 102(b). That provision makes clear that subject matter falling 
within the listed categories is uncopyrightable “regardless of the form 
in which [they are] described, explained, illustrated, or embodied.”204 
This suggests that the method of operation of the Java APIs is un-
copyrightable even if the manifestation of that method in Oracle’s 
declaring code involves creativity.205 Second, the decision represents 
                                                                                                 
201. Id. at 1351.  
202. Id.  
203. Id. at 1357 (quoting Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1372 (10th Cir. 1997)).  
204. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).  
205. Not long after the Federal Circuit’s opinion, which in fact purported to apply Ninth 
Circuit law on the scope of the 102(b) exclusion, Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1353, the Ninth Cir-
cuit itself, in Bikram’s Yoga Coll. of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032 
(9th Cir. 2015), held precisely the opposite. In Bikram, the Ninth Circuit considered the 
copyrightability of the sequence of yoga poses selected and arranged by hot yoga impresario 
Bikram Choudhury. The court found that Bikram’s sequence is a system or a method “de-
signed to ‘systematically work every part of the body, to give all internal organs, all the 
veins, all the ligaments, and all the muscles everything they need to maintain optimum 
health and maximum function.’” Id. at 1038. Such a system, the court held, was excluded 
from copyright protection by 102(b). Id. at 1039. Nor was Bikram’s contention relevant 
“that the Sequence’s arrangement of postures is ‘particularly beautiful and graceful.’” Id. at 
1040. Beauty, the court said, “is not a basis for copyright protection”, and the beauty of a 
process “does not permit one who describes it to gain, through copyright, the monopolistic 
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copyright’s struggles to understand its relationship to patent law. Ora-
cle’s declaring code could, if it meets patent’s entry requirements, be 
patented as a useful system. It is a useful thing that also contains ex-
pression. In fact, it is useful because of its expression — the choice of 
a naming structure for software becomes useful once programmers 
learn the naming structure and rely on it to build software. Does this 
expressive utility belong in patent? Patent law is equivocal, and the 
absence of a clear signal from patent may contribute to copyright’s 
inconsistency on the nature of the § 102(b) exclusions.  
2. The Useful Articles Doctrine  
If courts applying § 102(b) have had mixed success in predictably 
and defensibly separating the useful from the expressive, the record of 
copyright’s other primary mechanism for accomplishing this separa-
tion, the useful articles doctrine, has been no better. This may be in 
part because the courts have had less time to work out a stable rule. 
The first substantial articulation of the doctrine dates to only 1954 and 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mazer v. Stein.206 In that case, the 
Court held that a statuette used as part of a lamp base could be copy-
righted.207 The statuette, the Court observed, was a copyrightable 
sculpture that did not forfeit copyright eligibility merely because it 
had been affixed to a lamp.208  
Today the Copyright Act brings copyrightability into question for 
any pictorial, graphic or sculptural work having “an intrinsic utilitari-
an function.”209 The design of any such work is copyrightable “only 
if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, 
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of 
the article.”210 
Courts face two difficult problems in assessing the copyrightabil-
ity of useful articles: (1) determining when an article has an “intrin-
sic” utilitarian function, and (2) if the first question is answered 
affirmatively, determining whether the article’s functional and aes-
thetic components are in some sense separable. It is the first problem 
that concerns us most. To make the separability analysis run, courts in 
copyright cases must have some idea of what count as utilitarian as-
                                                                                                 
power to exclude all others from practicing it. This is true even where, as here, the process 
was conceived with at least some aesthetic considerations in mind.” Id.  
206. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).  
207. Id. at 201. 
208. Id. at 215–17.  
209. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. III 2004).  
210. Id. 
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pects of useful articles. They must have a sense of what usefulness 
means, so that intrinsically useful articles can be kept out of copy-
right. On that front, copyright lacks a theory.  
Consider copyright’s differential treatment of apparel and toys. 
Apparel, even the most aesthetically rich sort, such as a designer 
dress, is treated as useful because it covers the body. It doesn’t matter 
to copyright law that no woman buys a $5,000 dress because it covers 
her body and keeps her warm. She buys it for its aesthetic appeal. On 
the other hand, consider children’s toys. Some of them are quite use-
ful: for example, a toy airplane might be purchased to keep children 
entertained and quiet. The toy airplane might be attractive, but in most 
instances the purchase is motivated by a practical, functional concern. 
And yet the toy is treated like a purely aesthetic thing.211  
More generally, although it is obvious that most articles appeal on 
both aesthetic and functional levels, copyright lacks a theory of how 
much function is sufficient to remove a particular article, or class of 
articles, from its domain. A drop of functionality is sufficient to kill 
copyright in the ladies’ dress. A generous dollop of functionality does 
not prevent the law from extending copyright to the toy. An enormous 
preponderance of functionality does not prevent software from being 
copyrightable.  
One can make the same observation across a range of subject 
matter. Apparel is not copyrightable, but jewelry is. Much apparel is 
purchased with the same desire for adornment that motivates jewelry 
purchases — actually, motivates some jewelry purchases: large dia-
monds and thick chains of gold are sometimes purchased as portable 
bank accounts.212 Or, jewelry is purchased as a status signifier. Is an 
object’s capacity to store wealth or signify status not an element of its 
usefulness? Copyright law does not contemplate jewelry’s functionali-
ty; it sees only its use in adornment.213 But is adornment not a form of 
usefulness? It is if you want to attract attention. According to utility 
patent’s traditional technological conception of its domain, adornment 
                                                                                                 
211. See., e.g., Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L. Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 1983) (re-
versing district court determination that a toy airplane was a useful article: “[o]ther than the 
portrayal of a real airplane, a toy airplane, like a painting, has no intrinsic utilitarian func-
tion.”). 
212. See Gold Demand in India Never Fades, SEEKING ALPHA (May 11, 2015), 
http://seekingalpha.com/article/3167136-gold-demand-in-india-never-fades 
[https://perma.cc/7ZEB-6TJQ] (“Gold as a store of wealth is deep-rooted in Indian culture, 
especially for India’s predominantly rural population, where people do not have many 
choices for investment other than real estate and retail participation in equity markets is very 
meager.”).  
213. See Charles E. Colman, The History and Doctrine of American Copyright Protec-
tion for Fashion Design: Managing Mazer, 7 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 150, 183–90 
(2016) (detailing history of copyright protection for jewelry wherein courts grant protection 
of varying scope, but view jewelry as an aesthetic rather than useful object). 
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is not utility. Copyright, which has absorbed this traditional concep-
tion, therefore conceptualizes adornment as expression, and includes 
within its domain articles that provide it.  
The difficulty of conceptualizing the precise nature of an article’s 
utility was perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the recent Sixth Cir-
cuit decision in Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC.,214 which 
the Supreme Court recently decided.215 In Varsity Brands the question 
was whether the design of cheerleading uniforms, and particularly the 
specific layout of chevrons and other design elements on the uni-
forms, was useful.  
  
Figure 3: Varsity Brands’ Allegedly Infringed Designs 
The majority of the Sixth Circuit concluded that the designs were 
not useful. Speaking generally, the court held that, before addressing 
separability, a court should ask “[w]hat are the utilitarian aspects of 
the useful article?”216 Here the example the court gave was telling: 
“the utilitarian aspect of a chair is to provide a place for a person to 
sit.”217 The court felt compelled to focus its inquiry at that level of 
generality because “‘[p]ortray[ing] the appearance of the [useful] arti-
cle’ and ‘convey[ing] information’ are two utilitarian aspects that 
courts may not use to determine whether pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural features are separable.”218 So, for example, masquerading is not 
                                                                                                 
214. 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015).  
215. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., No. 15-866, 2017 WL 1066261, at *1 
(U.S. Mar. 22, 2017). 
216. Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 487. 
217. Id.  
218. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101) (alterations in original). 
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a useful function because it involves only “portraying the appearance 
of something (like a lion, ladybug, or orangutan).”219 Turning to the 
cheerleading uniforms at issue, the court described the relevant utili-
tarian functions simply as “cover[ing] the body, wick[ing] away mois-
ture, and withstand[ing] the rigors of athletic movements.”220 
Identifying the wearer as a cheerleader did not count, so the claimed 
design features were clearly separable from the utilitarian function.  
The dissent disagreed, particularly taking the majority to task for 
describing the function of the uniforms at such a high level of general-
ity, noting that the majority’s definition “could be used to describe all 
athletic wear.” That wasn’t good enough for the dissent, because 
“[w]ithout stripes, braids, and chevrons, we are left with a blank white 
pleated skirt and crop top,” which the reasonable observer would not 
associate with cheerleading.221 For the dissent, being recognizable as a 
cheerleading uniform counts as a function, and the design was not 
separable from that function.222  
It’s worth adding that copyright sometimes just gives up and ac-
cepts functional items within its domain. Take software, for example. 
U.S. copyright law classifies computer software as a “literary 
work”223 and recognizes the expressive qualities of computer code as 
perceptible by educated consumers of code. But the vast majority of 
people have no appreciation of software’s aesthetic content; they con-
sume code for what it does — that is, for its usefulness as an aid in 
creating documents or crunching numbers. Copyright has accepted 
software within its subject matter, and courts have developed tests 
                                                                                                 
219. Id. at 488 (quoting Chosun Int’l., Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324,  
329–30n.3 (2d Cir. 2005)).  
220. Id. at 490 (quoting Brief for Appellant, at 57).  
221. Id. at 495 (McKeague, J., dissenting). 
222. Professors Christopher Buccafusco and Jeanne Fromer filed an amicus brief in Var-
sity Brands urging the Supreme Court to recognize that clothing designs made to “look good 
on” the wearer also have intrinsic utilitarian function. See Brief of Professors Christopher 
Buccafusco and Jeanne Fromer as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Star Athletica, LLC 
v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 2017 WL 1066261 (U.S. Mar. 22, 2017) (No. 15-866). Buccafusco 
and Fromer, who have expanded their analysis in an academic article, do not argue that 
“looking good on” is a function that belongs to utility patent, nor do they offer a theory of 
the types of function excludable from copyright. See Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne 
Fromer, Fashion’s Function in Intellectual Property Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L.  
REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2826201 
[https://perma.cc/B7C4-WS63]. As noted previously (see note 25, supra), the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Varsity Brands avoided entirely the dispute regarding how precisely to 
identify the utilitarian aspects of the cheerleading uniform. 
223. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“‘Literary works’ are works, other than audiovisual works, ex-
pressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of 
the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, 
film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied.”). 
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designed to filter out functional aspects.224 But those tests are clearly 
not foolproof.225  
For another example, consider architectural designs embodied in 
buildings. It is unlawful to copy without permission a set of architec-
tural blueprints,226 which are functional because they serve as the 
template for the construction of a building but are nonetheless pro-
tected by copyright. However, until recently, it was entirely lawful, if 
one possessed a set of those blueprints, to erect a building based on 
them.227 Similarly, it was lawful to examine an already-existing build-
ing, take measurements, and then erect a facsimile. Buildings, in the 
eyes of copyright law, were functional, and thus uncopyrightable.228  
That changed in 1990, when Congress amended the Copyright 
Act to extend protection to a category of architectural works. In the 
AWCPA, Congress defined a protected architectural work to include 
“the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of ex-
pression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.”229 
The same provision that extended copyright law to built architecture 
also delimited the scope of that protection, providing that “[t]he work 
includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition 
of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual 
standard features.”230  
Copyright law’s inclusion of buildings, which surely mix aesthet-
ic with significant functional content, and simultaneous exclusion of 
other forms of subject matter — like designer apparel — in which the 
functional aspect is relatively muted, illustrates the absence of a theo-
ry governing how the presence of functionality is supposed to govern 
what’s in and what’s out of copyright. The only consistency in copy-
right’s treatment of utility is its ad hoc nature.  
                                                                                                 
224. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995). 
225. See discussion supra Section III.C.1; see also Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 
750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
226. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (including as copyrightable subject matter, inter alia, 
“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,” a class that includes architectural blueprints).  
227. For a discussion of pre-Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (“AWCPA”) 
copyright, see Kevin Emerson Collins, Economically Defeasible Rights to Facilitate Infor-
mation Disclosure: The Hidden Wisdom of Pre-AWCPA Copyright, (Washington University 
in St. Louis Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 15-09-01, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
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228. See generally id. 
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IV. CONSEQUENCES 
A. Internally Incoherent Doctrine 
Intellectual property law sorts subject matter into a variety of dif-
ferent regimes, each with different terms of protection and different 
rules of protectability, infringement, and defenses. For that sorting to 
be effective, IP needs principles to distinguish the subject matter of 
each system, even if some amount of overlap is inevitable. If we are 
going to have an IP system with different types of rights, then surely 
there must be reasons why certain rules apply to particular subject 
matter.  
Some might suggest that different forms of rights are needed be-
cause some subject matter is costlier to produce and more difficult to 
exclude others from. But even though that observation is undeniably 
true, it has virtually no explanatory power regarding existing doctrinal 
rules. Nothing in the eligibility rules for patent law limits it to costly 
subject matter, and indeed there are many patents on inventions that 
were relatively inexpensive to develop.231 At the same time, many 
types of copyrightable subject matter (such as blockbuster movies) are 
quite expensive to produce.232 The sorting rules we have simply can-
not be explained in terms of costs. Some other principles must be at 
work.  
Yet as we have argued, IP law’s sense of utility patent law’s do-
main is poorly theorized, and courts’ understanding of the boundaries 
of utility patent is mostly reductive and intuitive. While it is clear that 
claimed inventions must be useful, courts inconsistently enforce a 
technological understanding of utility. That view of utility is norma-
tive rather than empirical. Its under-theorization has consequences for 
patent law itself, consequences that cascade across the other forms of 
IP because each of the other systems defers protection for these useful 
or functional features to utility patent.  
For those who believe the primary purpose of IP is to create in-
centives, this state of affairs should be a source of significant concern. 
Patent rules differ from copyright rules and from trademark rules, and 
each set of rules creates different incentives. Thus the sorting rules 
                                                                                                 
231. See, e.g., Clayton Park, Easy fix for Eyeglasses lands Daytona Beach Shores inven-
tor on national TV, THE DAYTONA BEACH NEWS JOURNAL (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.news-journalonline.com/news/20150415/easy-fix-for-eyeglasses-lands-daytona-
beach-shores-inventor-on-national-tv [https://perma.cc/VX65-M6AZ] (detailing invention 
of patented kit that eases eyeglass repair). 
232. See generally Kristen Acuna & Jason Guerrasio, The 30 most expensive movies ever 
made, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/most-expensive-
movies-ever-2014-6 (last visited Mar. 24, 2017). 
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cannot help but shape the nature and direction of innovation. For ex-
ample, the incentives to develop new or improved placebo triggers 
could vary considerably depending on whether we recognize the utili-
ty of those triggers and sort them into utility patent (and out of trade-
mark). Similarly, the incentives regarding software are necessarily 
shaped by the ways we sort some aspects into patent law and others 
into copyright.  
Let us give another example of the policy tradeoffs that are at 
stake. A 2008 study by economist Yi Qian examined counterfeiting in 
China of branded shoes.233 In particular, Qian exploited a natural ex-
periment created by the Chinese government’s “reallocation of [intel-
lectual property] enforcement resources away from monitoring foot-
footwear and fashion products to other sectors in response to several 
food-poisoning and gas-explosion accidents in the early 1990s.”234 
She did so in order to study the behavior of footwear companies that 
operate in low enforcement environments.235 Qian found that brands 
with less effective copyright and trademark protection used several 
strategies to differentiate, including investing in product attributes or 
technological features which are difficult to imitate.236  
In other words, one effect of weaker copyright and trademark en-
forcement is to encourage innovation in tangible product qualities, 
largely of the type we might associate with utility patent law. While 
that particular shift was the result of external factors making enforce-
ment of some forms of IP less reliable rather than doctrinal rules that 
excluded certain features from particular forms of protection, the gen-
eral point holds: the unavailability of one form of IP creates incentives 
for parties to invest in the types of features for which other forms of 
protection might be available. That means, at least at the margins, that 
we get different types of innovation.  
The takeaway for policy is almost entirely normative — optimal 
institutional design depends on what sort of innovation we prefer, and 
why. Referring to the example directly above, imagine we think that 
better shoe technology creates more social value, perhaps through the 
creation of positive externalities (for example, more willingness to 
walk, leading to better fitness, leading to lower health care costs) rela-
tive to the proliferation of otherwise meaningless symbols and orna-
mental elements of shoe design. If we favor this “technological” sort 
                                                                                                 
233. Yi Qian, Impacts of Entry by Counterfeiters, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1577 (2008). 
234. Id. at 1578.  
235. The data set includes both domestic Chinese brands and those of multinational com-
panies operating in China. Id.  
236. Id. The branded companies also set up their own brand-protection offices and in-
vested in self-enforcement, created licensed company stores (vertically integrated), and used 
pricing signals, among other things. Id. 
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of shoe innovation, then maybe we prefer an environment of low IP 
enforcement (or at least low enforcement of trademarks and design 
rights). More generally, whatever the theory of IP is, we need to ac-
count for why we care about some sorts of innovation rather than oth-
ers, or at least why we think different sorts of innovation should be 
subject to different rules. This is the case not least because in some 
instances it may be important to leave some sorts of innovation open 
to competition while encouraging other types through propertization. 
Even those who are less focused on incentives ought to be con-
cerned about the under-theorization of the concept of utility and its 
corresponding effects on the boundary policing doctrines. For one 
thing, whatever one’s theory of IP, we still need some way of under-
standing the divided nature of the IP system, and we still need some 
way of sorting subject matter into those systems. We need to recog-
nize that, as the legal landscape currently stands, parties make strate-
gic use of different forms of IP, often frustrating those sorting 
doctrines.  
B. Normative Choices About Competition and Innovation 
The choice of IP systems will also have significant competitive 
consequences. Different mixes of IP regimes (and of IP regimes with 
other types of regulatory exclusivity) will promote competition along 
different dimensions. A patent-heavy system will promote competi-
tion along utilitarian or conventionally functional characteristics, and 
systems that rely more on trademark/advertising are going to promote 
competition along other, more phenomenological dimensions.  
Until we appreciate all forms of utility, and until we have a calcu-
lus for understanding their relative value, we can’t think coherently 
about which types of competition we want to promote or the costs of 
promoting that type of competition. Nor can we even think about how 
best to satisfy consumers’ actual demand, or how different IP regimes 
can help shape that demand. We are blind to a variety of considera-
tions that affect consumer welfare when we view products only in 
terms of their physical characteristics.  
How we construct each of the IP systems, and how we conceive 
of the interaction among those systems, necessarily embeds a choice 
about the type of competition, and therefore the type of innovation, 
we want to produce. There is no neutral here, for each of the different 
branches of intellectual property law must decide a foundational ques-
tion: what’s in — that is, what elements of a product count as innova-
tion or as relevant to consumer choice and are therefore recognized 
and protected by the law — and what’s out — that is, what features 
are not protected because they are not recognized as innovation (even 
when they are, indeed, new)? Or, perhaps even more profoundly, what 
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product features are not protected because they are not even recog-
nized by the law as comprising part of the “product” that consumers 
experience?  
We do not contend that utility patent law is necessarily wrong to 
focus only on certain kinds of utility. Nor do we argue that trademark 
law or any of the other regimes are wrong to borrow this conception 
of utility as the basis for excluding things from those systems.237 But 
we should recognize that this technological focus is normative rather 
than empirical. Technological utility clearly is not the only kind of 
utility. Utility patent law nonetheless sees only certain kinds of utility. 
If that were a well-theorized and conscious choice, it would be one 
thing. But in reality the choice to preference technological utility is 
obscured by rhetoric that pretends utility has a clear, singular mean-
ing. That choice has a strong tendency to bias evaluation of the 
sources of relevant utility.  
Failure to recognize these choices is why utility patent’s techno-
logical focus is only inconsistently apparent in doctrine. We need a 
better understanding and fuller explication of what counts as utility or 
functionality in each branch of IP, and why.  
If one believes that overlapping rights (or cumulation of rights) is 
a problem (as we do), then we need to recognize that this is one sig-
nificant part of the explanation for the cumulation we are witnessing. 
Even when courts want to channel, they cannot do it effectively with-
out a clear sense of what belongs in utility patent. The inability to de-
fine the boundaries of patent law undermines the whole project of 
channeling.  
There are at least a few possible approaches to dealing with that 
problem. One approach would be to more aggressively exclude things 
from non-utility patent areas of IP. If utility patent law is in fact open 
to much more than technological innovation, and if we believe in a 
patent supremacy principle, then our channeling doctrines might well 
be too narrow. Trying to exclude only things that are technologically 
useful actually is under-representative of the policy judgments of pa-
tent law. Maybe patent law is meant to contain things that are useful 
in much more than the technological sense. So innovations that are 
valuable because they shape preferences, or improve the appeal of 
products, or affect competition, would be brought firmly within the 
domain of patent law.  
The result of this more aggressive channeling to utility patent law 
might well be a contraction in the effective total scope of IP protec-
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serve this sort of channeling role. McKenna, supra note 152; McKenna & Strandburg, supra 
note 6.  
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tion. If applied consistently, patent’s rigorous entry requirements 
would filter out a lot. But of course there is always the risk that more 
aggressive channeling to utility patent would lead to the softening of 
patent’s entry requirements, with a consequent broadening of the ef-
fective scope of IP law.  
Alternatively, if we thought that patent law was actually catholic 
about its domain, we might conclude that there is less reason to think 
patent law should be supreme and that utility patent law should devel-
op more doctrines to exclude things from its domain because they 
belong to other regimes.238 That would be a channeling system less 
about the superiority of one area and more about equivalent domain-
based deference between all the areas.  
Of course, doing that would require a clear delineation of the sub-
ject matter of all of the regimes. And it may be that, as economic the-
ory has focused so much on value and efficiency, we have lost the 
ability to describe subject matter categories in ontological terms, mak-
ing it much harder to explain the specificity of each of the systems.239  
Lastly, we might decide that we really do think that utility patent 
law is and should be limited to technological innovation. We would 
need to think harder about what exactly that means, but it would give 
us a much clearer basis on which to operationalize a utility patent su-
premacy principle.  
That last approach would not solve all the problems regarding 
channeling doctrines, of course. There are still difficult questions 
about where to draw the line: in the common case in which features 
are both functional and aesthetic, how aggressive should a system be 
in excluding those features?240  
But this approach would allow us to see clearly the ways in which 
we make normative choices about the types of innovation and utility 
that we sort, without pretending that functionality is self-defining. The 
meaning of these terms should not be driven by their lexical bounda-
ries, which are in any case imprecise. Our decisions regarding what’s 
in and what’s out of each branch of IP should be driven by what we 
perceive as the best innovation policy. Importantly, this means that we 
must understand and take into account how the different branches of 
IP law, which (at least tacitly, and at best inconsistently) employ these 
different understandings of what innovation is, and incentivize the 
creation of different sorts of innovation. Understanding what the best 
innovation policy is requires that we make a decision regarding what 
                                                                                                 
238. One might explain the printed matter doctrine that way, but there would be more ex-
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239. Cf. ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? passim (2015) 
(criticizing “value” as incapable of generating IP rules with specificity).  
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sort of innovation we want. Then we must shape the law — including 
the relationship between the different branches of the IP law — to 
obtain it.  
 
